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INTRODUCTION
Internet patents' are unquestionably a hot topic. The United States
Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") is awash in applications.2 No
Associate Professor, Willamette University College of Law, B.S.E.E., Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology, 1973; J.D., University of Michigan, 1977. My thanks to
Professor Glynn Lunney, Professor Toshiko Takenaka, Professor Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
John Whitaker of Merchant & Gould and the participants in Professors Dreyfuss's and Take-
naka's seminar at the University of Washington for a number of very helpful comments and
to Nicole Owren-Wiest for her most able research assistance. I gratefully acknowledge Ora-
cle Corporation, Lyon & Lyon and Willamette University College of Law research grants
made in connection with the preparation of this article.
1. For purposes of this article "Internet patents" include patents protecting methods of
doing business on the Internet, standing alone or as computing implementations. Patents
covering the basic equipment and telecommunications routing, switching and other related
technologies vital to the operation of the Internet's infrastructure are excluded.
2. See, e.g., John T. Aquino, Patently Permissive, A.B.A. J., May 1999, at 30; Saul
Hansell, As Patents Multiply, Web Sites find Lawsuits are a Click Away, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
11, 1999, at Al; Josh Lerner, Where Does State Street Lead? A First Look at Finance Pat-
ents, 1971-2000 1 (Sept. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the National Bureau of
Economic Research), available at http://vwvw.nber.org/papers/w7918; Richard Maulsby,
Under Secretary Dickinson Initiates Action Plan for Business Method Patents, USPTO To-
DAY, Spring 2000, at 8 (noting e-commerce related patent applications have doubled between
1998 and 1999); John R. Thomas, The Post-Industrial Patent System, 10 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 3, 4 (1999)(citing numerous sources).
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sooner did the first patents issue than a wave of litigation broke over the
marketplace Commentators of all types, business,4 academic5 and even
the regular press (electronic and otherwise)6 which normally avoids the
esoteric and boring issues of intellectual property law, have weighed in
on the issue. Something interesting, and maybe even important, must be
happening; something which deserves a closer look.
Most of the excitement can be traced back to the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC") decision in State Street Bank & Trust
v. Signature Financial Group The opinion in that case triggered pro-
found changes in the role of patent law in Internet commerce. First, it
consolidated the CAFC's strong support for the patentability of software
inventions.8 Second, and more importantly, it has been widely inter-
3. See, e.g., Fantasy Sports Props., Inc. v. CBS Sportsline, et al., 103 F. Supp. 2d 886
(E.D. Va. 2000); Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (W.D.
Wash. 1999), vacated by 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001); DoubleClick, Inc. v. L90 Inc., No.
2:99-1914 (E.D. Va. filed Nov. 12 1999); Priceline.com, Inc. v. Microsoft, No. 3:99 CV
1991 (D. Conn. filed Oct. 13, 1999); Hansell, supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., Victoria Slind-Flor, Gold Diggers, CORPORATE COUNSEL (Dec. 20, 1999)
available at http:/lwww.lawnewsnetwork.comlstories/A1 1873-1999Dec17.html (on file with
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review ("MTTLR")); Letter to the
Editor: Re: "Gold Diggers" (Dec. 29, 1999) at http:llwww.lawnewsnetwork.comlstories/
A12441-1999Dec29.html (on file with MTrLR); Dugie Standeford, Book Publisher
Launches Cybercampaign Against Amazon.com, E-CoMimRCE LAW WEEKLY (Mar. 8, 2000)
available at http://www.lawnewsnetwork.com/stories/A18094-2000Mar7.html (on file with
MTTLR).
5. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Busi-
ness?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 263 (2000); Robert P. Merges, As
Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts
and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 577 (1999); Leo J. Raskind, The State
Street Bank Decision: the Bad Business Of Unlimited Patent Protection for Methods of Do-
ing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 61 (1999); Richard H. Stem,
Scope-of-Protection Problems with Patents and Copyrights on Methods of Doing Business,
10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 105; Thomas, supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., James Gleick, Patently Absurd, NEw YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, March 12,
2000, at 44; Hansell, supra note 2.
7. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
8. In particular, that such inventions fit within the statutory classes of patentable sub-
ject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). See id. at 1375. The CAFC, which possesses
exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in patent application and infringement cases, had been
gradually moving toward this position. See Vincent Chiappetta, Patentability of Computer
Software Instruction as an "Article of Manufacture:" Software as Such as the Right Stuff, 17
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 89, 106-113 (1998) [hereinafter Chiappetta, Article of
Manufacture]. To obtain a patent the additional requirements of usefulness, novelty, non-
obviousness and description/enablement must be satisfied. Id. at 99-106. The CAFC ex-
pressly acknowledged the point in both State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375, and in AT&T
Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
528 U.S. 946 (1999) (following State Street Bank regarding § 101 statutory subject matter
issue).
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preted as disposing of the venerable, if questioned," doctrine that pat-
ents could not be obtained on methods of doing business. These two
obstacles cleared, the rush to patent Internet business related innova-
tions began in earnest.
This symposium's topic, the proper scope for this burgeoning crop
of Internet patents, requires a two step analysis. First, we must deter-
mine how we should feel about such patents-are they a good or bad
thing within the patent law and Internet business contexts? That re-
sponse, in turn, dictates the appropriate approach to the second order
determination of how we should deal with the granting and enforcement
of such patents. If we are favorably disposed, then the patent system can
get on with implementing what State Street Bank started, focusing on
issues of prior art identification, examiner expertise and perhaps a few
specific, but relatively minor, variations necessary to accommodate this
new field of invention. However, if the mere granting of such patents
raises concerns, then much greater adjustments aimed at reining them
in, or even eliminating them, are required.
The "how we should feel" question is best answered by bifurcating
the issue. Patent protection for novel and non-obvious advances in com-
puting (software or hardware) is normatively non-problematic." In
9. Not surprisingly, as that is precisely what the court said it was doing. See State
Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375. But see Thomas, supra note 2, at 27 (arguing, convincingly,
that the purported holding is actually primarily dicta on the facts before the court); see also
Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra note 8, at 133 n.229, 161 n.297. The USPTO cer-
tainly is standing by its Guidelines and continues to issue patents on methods of doing
business. See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478,
7479 (Feb. 28, 1996)(instructing examiners not to categorize claims as methods of doing
business, cited with approval in State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1377); Thomas, supra note 2,
at 30-31.
10. See Rinaldo Del Gallo, Ill, Are "Methods of Doing Business" Finally Out of Busi-
ness as a Statutory Rejection?, 38 IDEA: J. L. & Tech. 403, 411-12 (arguing against the
exception, noting prior commentators had found it "ghostlike" in nature and referencing
Judge Newman's well-known dissent from In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 296-99 (Fed. Cir.
1994)).
11. See generally Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra note 8; infra notes 21-30
and accompanying text. Or at least no more so than any other advance which lies within the
appropriate reach of the patent incentive. The analysis in this Article proceeds on the as-
sumption that the patent system works properly and the only question is whether Internet
innovations properly fit within its ambit. Cf Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or Intel-
lectual Property Olympian? A Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEo.
MASON L. REv. 69, 90 n. 133 (1999) [hereinafter Chiappetta, Myth]. It is hardly a forgone
conclusion that this assumption is correct. Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age
of Venture Capital, 4 J. S11tALL & EmERGING Bus. L. 137, 139 (2000) (noting Fritz
Machlup's conclusion in a 1958 study that "if we didn't have a patent system if would irre-
sponsible to create one"); infra note 112. Although this issue does not raise any particularly
unique concerns for software patenting, it does influence the competitive arts analysis by
making an already strong case against traditional patenting that much more convincing. See
infra notes 150-74 and accompanying text.
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contrast, protecting even novel and non-obvious methods of doing busi-
ness, and specifically the means of competing (the "competitive arts"),"2
fits poorly within the doctrinal, historical and policy foundations of tra-
ditional patent law and should be avoided. 3
The Electronic Age's disruption of the market's normal "first-to-
move lead-time" incentive (through the ease and speed of recognizing,
identifying and replicating advances in competitive means) justifies,
however, some more modest intellectual property protection. 14 Ad-
dressing this particular market failure would require extensive and risky
modification of either the existing patent or copyright laws. A better
solution lies in melding aspects of both systems to create an independ-
ent "competitive arts regime" designed expressly, and exclusively, to
supplement the reduced lead-time incentive while minimizing interfer-
ence with desirable market forces.' 5
Achieving this objective calls for combining the demanding and
precise qualification structure of patent law with the nuanced rights and
remedial approach of copyright law. Patent law's novelty, claiming and
independent examination requirements provide the threshold, specificity
and vigilance against over-reaching essential to appropriately limiting
the regime's reach. Infringement should, similarly, adopt patent law's
constrained, claims-based literal and equivalents approach. Proper
functioning of the new regime, however, will require significant ad-
justments to traditional implementation of these requirements. In
particular, examiner training and search tools must be tailored, a burden
of coming forward with prior art must be imposed on the applicant, and
a pre-issuance publication and post-grant opposition procedure must be
instituted, in order to properly reflect the business context, the long
12. There are a wide variety of innovations that might fall under the general heading of
"methods of doing business." See infra notes 31-38 and accompanying text. This Article
only deals with the subclass involving the way businesses compete and not those processes
for creating the services (or products) actually sold.
13. See infra notes 41-174 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part II (discussing the justifications for protection). As the discussion
notes, this lead-time problem derives from and shares much in common with the quick and
cheap copying problem first recognized in the computer software debate. See, e.g., Dennis S.
Kariala, A Coherent Theory for the Copyright Protection of Computer Software and Recent
Judicial Interpretations, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 53, 53-55 (1997) [hereinafter Karijala, A Coher-
ent Theory]; Jerome H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright
Dichotomy: Premises for a Restructured International Intellectual Property System, 13 CAR-
DOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 475, 517-20 (1995) [hereinafter Reichman, Charting]; Jerome H.
Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REv.
2432, 2504-19 (1994) [hereinafter Reichman, Legal Hybrids]; Pamela Samuelson, Randall
Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor & Jerome H. Reichman, A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Pro-
tection of Computer Programs, 94 COLuM. L. REv. 2308 (1994) [hereinafter Manifesto].
15. See infra Part IT (describing the new regime).
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history and the less frequently documented environment in which com-
petitive arts innovation occurs. Additionally, a more demanding
standard of obviousness should be applied, limiting the regime's incen-
tives to paradigm-shifting pioneering innovations and leaving the
primary form of competitive arts advance (emulative adoption coupled
with modest differentiation) to market forces.
Regarding rights and remedies, the new regime must part company
with patent law. Supplementing the weakened first-to-move lead-time
market incentive requires only a gentle nudge to competitive arts inno-
vation. Applying a patent holder's "one size fits all" virtually absolute
right to exclude provides excessive incentive, leaving the related social
costs of lost competition and foregone follow-on improvements unjusti-
fied. Copyright law's greater willingness to tailor rights and remedies to
the particular need provides a much better approach. Specifically, a set
of rights tracking the basic balance reflected in the "cover" concept of
§ 115 of the Copyright Act 6 (appropriately adjusted to reflect the com-
petitive arts context), can more appropriately bolster the weakened first-
to-move lead-time incentives. Granting a right to first implementation
preserves any market advantages associated with recognition as the in-
novator. A modified compulsory licensing scheme requiring royalty
payments (designed, however, solely to provide modest cost-
differentiation rather than compensation) mimics a lead-time advantage
over competitors. Others remain free, as in the marketplace, to compete
by adopting and improving upon the technique. The royalty, however,
provides the innovator with a cost advantage over subsequent adopters.
While they attempt to close this gap, the innovator can pursue advantage
consolidating activities similar to those used in the normal competitive
marketplace.
Two refinements round out the regime. First, in order to more
closely parallel the commercial realities of the market's incentives, the
innovator's rights should be limited to a relatively short term (perhaps
as little as one year) and recognize independent creation as a complete
defense. Second, in order to avoid increased possibilities for jurisdic-
tional gamesmanship afforded by the Internet environment, the rights
should extend to any implementation of the technique, independent of
its geographic locus, whenever the effects are felt within the United
States market.
If we cannot find the fortitude to promptly pursue a new more ap-
propriate form of competitive arts protection, a number of
16. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1994). Although the "cover" concept provides the basis for an ap-
propriate remedy in the new regime, the actual remedy differs in a number of important
respects. See infra Part M.
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administrative ind judicial adjustments to the post-State Street Bank
patenting status quo should be instituted immediately. Changes in rights
creation, enforcement and remedies, better aligning them with the ap-
proaches of the proposed regime, can significantly reduce the
consequences of over-protection under traditional patent law.
Because the new regime relies heavily on the patent framework re-
garding qualification, adjusting current examination procedures can
substantially minimize the number of "bad" competitive arts patents (as
defined by current patent law objectives) and properly restrict the scope
of the rights under "good" ones. 8 As an initial step, claims to competi-
tive arts innovation must always be carefully separated from advances
in computing (including the mere fact of Internet implementation). This
will ensure appropriate examination for novelty and non-obviousness
exclusively within each distinct field of endeavor. Then appropriate
substantive examiner expertise, prior art search tools and techniques and
non-obviousness standards (mirroring those of the proposed regime)
can, and should, be applied. Additionally, examiner evaluation criteria
and compensation should specifically encourage investing sufficient
time and effort to build the precise and complete examination record
necessary to generate well-defined and properly limited claims. Finally,
these restricted rights should be fully incorporated into enforcement ac-
tions through explicit judicial reference to, and reliance on, the
examination record when assessing claims (in particular, those in means
plus function format) and applying the doctrine of equivalents.
Remedial adjustments present greater challenges under the current
patent statute. A good argument can be made, however, that the courts
have the authority to make the basic, but crucial, shift from the present
property rules to a liability rules approach. This change would permit
the standard infringement remedy to more closely parallel the proposed
regime's compulsory licensing strategy, generally replacing injunctive
prohibition with a commercially reasonable (and, to the extent statuto-
rily possible, only a modest cost-differentiating) royalty payment. At a
minimum, the increasingly routine grant of preliminary prohibitive in-
junctions should disappear. The courts should insist, even in the face of
strong likelihood of success, on truly exceptional circumstances clearly
demonstrating the inadequacy of an interim royalty-based cost advan-
tage.
Combining these adjustments with a revitalized application of the
judicially created and controlled patent misuse doctrine can substan-
17. See infra Part IV (discussing the appropriate adjustments).
18. Including those suggestions discussed by Professor Merges. See Merges, supra note
5, at 607-09; infra notes 223-40 and accompanying text.
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tially reduce the unjustified social costs of even "good" competitive arts
patents. The courts should continue to recognize traditional antitrust-
based misuse, such as tying and monopolization, in the competitive arts
context. However, the misuse doctrine should be expanded to comple-
ment the compulsory licensing remedy focus on greater access by
fostering voluntary licensing. Specifically, the patent holder should
carry the burden of demonstrating a commercially reasonable basis for
refusing to grant a requested license. Failure to justify would result in
unenforceability of the patent against the party requesting the license.
Similarly, if an infringement defendant fails to request a license, then
the compulsory licensing remedy could either be replaced with a tradi-
tional prohibitory injunction or accompanied by supplemental
deterrence based damages.
Finally, and in all instances, any additional harm to competition
should be avoided. Building on the learning from the software debates,
protection of competitive arts functional innovation must be limited to
patent law.' 9 The courts should, therefore, consistently reject all at-
tempts to obtain any over-lapping copyright protection of the non-
expressive aspects of the innovation.
Part I of this Article addresses the appropriateness of protecting In-
ternet innovations under the current patent regime. It concludes that the
doctrinal, historical and policy arguments require different outcomes
regarding computing (patentable subject matter) and competitive arts (at
best a difficult fit) innovation. Part II argues that the new electronic
economy has given rise to a particular kind of competitive arts "market
failure" (interference with first-to-move lead-time incentives) which
must be addressed. It concludes, however, that tinkering with the exist-
ing patent or copyright regimes is not only complex, but poses
significant risks, and should be avoided. Part III sketches the outlines of
a proposed competitive arts regime, combining the qualification features
of patent law with the more nuanced approach to rights and remedies of
copyright law. Part IV concludes by outlining a number of interim
measures necessary to mitigate the effects of protecting the competitive
arts under traditional patent law while awaiting the arrival of the new
regime.
19. See infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Dennis
Kaijala's approach to the similar issue raised in the software context).
2000-20011
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I. SHOULD INTERNET PATENTS EXIST?
The answer to this question depends on what the Internet patent
claims.20 If the "invention" involves a novel, non-obvious computing
implementation, then the assessment does not depend on anything
unique to the Internet business environment. Its patentability stands or
falls on the more general question of the legitimacy of computing
patents (more specifically software patents) as a class. I have argued
elsewhere that properly limited claims to innovative computing
implementations (hardware or software) do not raise patentable subject
matter concerns.2' If anything, the software patentability portion of the
State Street Bank decision does not go far enough in this respect. Both
the residual reliance on physical structure2 and the emphasis on the
nature of the output of the computer systemn provide inadequate
protection to software innovations "as such."24 A variety of important
implementation questions, such as the USPTO's practical ability to
perform the necessary prior art searches 2s and the proper scope of
20. Patents are defined by their claims, which form an important part of the specifica-
tion required under § 112. See 35 U.S.C. § 112; Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra
note 8, at 104. It is not always apparent what the claims cover, but for purposes of this dis-
cussion, it is enough to draw the broad division between computing technologies and the
underlying processes indicated in the text. See Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra
note 8, at 141-43, 155-59, 176 n.340.
21. The key lies in separating true software claims from claims, which although
couched in software terms actually cover the underlying non-computing process. Chiappetta,
Article of Manufacture, supra note 8. The former are machines (components) and per se
patentable subject matter. They must, however, also find their novelty and non-obviousness
in the computing arts. Id. at 168-76. The latter must satisfy the patentability requirements,
including subject matter, independently of the software articulation. Id.
22. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (reconstructing the means for claims from the specification to
demonstrate the existence of a machine); see also Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra
note 8, at 133 n.229 (discussing the machine aspects of the holding).
23. See Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra note 8, at 133 n.229 (discussing the
utility aspects of the holding); cf Thomas, supra note 2, at 26-27 (noting the unjustified
combination of the statutory subject matter and utility tests).
24. See Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra note 8, at 154-59 (arguing we should
go further and permit direct claiming of software inventions). Others have noted more prag-
matically, that despite these shortcomings, the CAFC and USPTO seem to have settled into a
comfort zone concerning software patentability and, given Congresses' apparent lack of
interest, it is time to move on to the important questions regarding implementation. See, e.g.,
Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Softvare Industry, 89
CAL. L. REv. 1 (2001) (noting patentable subject matter questions "are for the history
books"). Certainly, the CAFC decision in AT&T Corp. v. Excel Cormnunications, Inc., 172
F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999), and the USPTO continued issuance of a wide-range of software
patents, confirm this view.
25. See Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra note 8, at 101. These practical issues
apply with even more force to the issue of business method patentability. The same approach
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enforcement 6 do remain. Although these concerns argue for some
circumspection, they do not lead to the conclusion that computing
innovations (including those related to the Internet) fall outside the
proper scope of patent law protection.2 7
The real computing (software or otherwise) issue, therefore, is not
about patentability, but avoiding inadvertent and improper entanglement
with any underlying activity being implemented.2 Computing patents
should only cover novel and non-obvious computing innovations.
Claims which go further and implicate the non-computing activity itself
should be dealt with separately, with each type of claim independently
standing or falling on its own merits. Separation is not a particularly
difficult task, requiring only appropriate limitations in the claims and
that the assessment of novelty and non-obviousness focuses on the ap-
propriate art. 9 There is, therefore, no need for anxiety that granting
patents for computing innovations must unavoidably spill over to dis-
rupt the competitive balance in non-computing fields."' If properly
crafted and examined they are computing patents and nothing more.
to resolving them in that context are equally workable in the software context. See infra
notes 223-26 and accompanying text (discussing the necessary actions).
26. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 24 (discussing the need for a reverse engineering
exception and an appropriately narrow application of the doctrine of equivalents).
27. See supra notes 23-24 (noting the available solutions).
28. See generally Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra note 8.
29. See Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra note 8, at 154-59, 168-76.
30. The concern that this would result in over-protection of the underlying process was,
appropriately, extremely prevalent in the earlier days of the software patentability debate.
See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for
Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 ErORY L. J. 1025, 1126-
27 (1990) (a good example of the kind of concern routinely raised concerning the algorithm
analysis of software inventions). The concern affects the Internet patent debate because of
the frequent computer implementation of business methods, particularly in the Internet envi-
ronment. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 5, at 586 (embedding business concepts in software
permits characterization as novel computer programs); Stem, supra note 5, at 129 (noting
that computer implementation makes the business method part of the technological arts).
Distinguishing between software as machine component and software as language eliminates
this concern. See Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra note 8, at 154-59. Additionally,
it is important not to confuse the field of application with the nature of the innovation.
Merely because a computing innovation implements a method of doing business does not
make the invention a business method patent. Id. at 131, 160. Although exclusive patent
rights to the novel and non-obvious computing implementation may afford practical control
over the underlying methodology, that is the point of the patent laws. The inventor is re-
warded for the technological advance and others are left to attempt to develop alternative
competitive implementations. Id. at 163. Except for the explicit reference in State Street
Bank to the "method of doing business doctrine," this distinction between where the inven-
tion is used (business) and the invention itself (computing) would have been a nice way to
finesse the reach of that case on its facts. In other words, the fact that it was used to imple-
ment a mutual fund system did not make the computing invention unpatentable subject
matter. See infra note 56.
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In contrast, Internet patents laying claim to underlying non-
computing innovations are far more problematic.31 Stripping away the
computing implementation leaves a broad range of activities which raise
"business method" patentability concerns. The system might satisfy a
regulatory requirement (as in State Street Bank),3z provide a service (for
example, a computer-generated diagnosis or legal advice) or financial
product,33 record a specific transaction (like a stock trade or the purchase
of a book or compact-disk) or implement a sales technique,' marketing
program,35 or special internal business organizational structure." The
sub-class of sales, marketing and internal organization techniques has
stirred the greatest controversy in the current Internet patenting debate.
Permitting patents on activities such as prospect identification, lead
follow-up, or transactions facilitation (in the Internet environment, cus-
tomer profiling, triggers for displaying particular banner advertisements,
affiliate referral systems and one-click checkouts) would grant exclu-
sive control over the general competitive means for delivery of any
product or service. Therefore, the following discussion focuses primar-
ily on the question of whether this sub-class of business methods, the
competitive arts, is properly patentable subject matter.3"
31. There is a third category in which the applicant acknowledges that neither the com-
puting implementation nor the underlying methodology is novel (or more likely non-
obvious), but the mere fact of using the existing Internet computing tools to implement the
known method is innovative. As with any automation as innovation claim, the relevant non-
obviousness inquiry is whether a person of ordinary skill in Internet computing would find
the mere fact of moving an already "known" business methodology to the Internet obvious.
Consequently, it is highly unlikely such "inventions" can survive a proper § 103 review. See
Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra note 8, at 170 n.324; infra note 301 (discussing
the relationship between nonobviousness in computing techniques and novelty in the com-
petitive arts).
32. A number of commentators have pointed out that the State Street Bank system did
not merely automate profit and loss allocations, but also necessary compliance with the
Treasury regulations applicable to pooled fund partnership operations. See Dreyfuss, supra
note 5, at 265; Raskind, supra note 5, at 86; Stem, supra note 5, at 131.
33. See Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis v. Merrill Lynch, 564 F.Supp. 1358 (D. Del.
1983) (involving a cash management account).
34. Such as the Amazon "one-click" checkout patent asserted against Bamesandno-
ble.com. See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1231
(W.D. Wash. 1999), vacated by, 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
35. Such as the DoubleClick targeted banner advertisement patent or the Amazon affili-
ate referral patents.
36. See In re Maucorps, 609 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
37. This area is driving the current wave of litigation and commentary. See supra note 3
and accompanying text.
38. The following discussion, therefore, assumes that the product or service involved is
equally available to all competitors and that relevant point of differentiation is the methods
used to operate the business and, particularly, how the product or service is marketed, sold
and delivered to the buyer. For example, it is assumed that the books or CDs available on an
Internet site are undifferentiated and that innovations take place regarding the specifics of
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The answer to this question has two related effects on business
method patenting. It dictates whether patents can issue based on claims
reaching beyond computer implementations to all uses of the underlying
activity, i.e., pure competitive arts patents. In the current environment,
however, this outcome may be of limited practical concern. An Internet
business normally will find it entirely satisfactory to limit the claims to
the computing implementation of the method, thus avoiding the pure
form of business method subject matter challenge. 9 This restricted
claiming technique makes the second effect, whether such patents
should issue based exclusively on innovation in the underlying business
method, critical. Only if the pure competitive arts are proper subject
matter, do those advances represent the type of "progress" targeted by
the patent law incentive. If they are not, such novelty should not, re-
gardless of the form of the claims, support issuance of a patent.
4
0
Business method patentability is hardly a new question.4' Therefore,
the most direct approach to resolving the competitive arts sub-question
involves assessing the rationales developed in the cases considering the
more general issue. Unfortunately, these materials fail to provide a con-
vincing basis for a decision either way. The "business method
exception" opinions offer no logical argument for treating business
how the site is marketed and operates. The line, of course, is hardly crisp. For example, does
the system at issue in State Street Bank, supra note 22, involve a computing implementation,
a financial product (the participation in the aggregate fund), a service (the financial report-
ing) or a marketing tool (the rapid and efficient provision of the product or the service)?
Only the latter would involve the competitive arts. Although insights gained from close
scrutiny of this particular subclass can usefully inform decisions regarding other subclasses,
a distinction nonetheless must be made. The conclusions reached only apply to competitive
means. In particular, financial products and methods make even analogies suspect in light of
the tricky definitional and analytical issues they raise. Are they things (the money they pro-
duce), services (managing or investing money to best advantage) or methods (ways of
making money)? Are the appropriate analogs to tangible products, methods of competition
or is entirely independent assessment required? Resolution of this extremely complex set of
issues is well beyond the scope of this discussion and must await another day.
39. As the Internet continues to evolve, however, escaping such limitations may become
important to avoid technological "lock-out." See Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra
note 8, at 153-54 (noting the same evolution problem in the software context raised by the
tangible medium restriction under the USPTO Examination Guidelines).
40. The same argument applies to claims to software "as such" when the only novelty
lies in the underlying activity. See Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra note 8, at 171-
73 (explaining this § 102 "point of novelty" analysis and the related example that discovery
of a law of nature (F=na, E=mc2) would not provide patentable novelty in a claim to the
implementing soft-ware). See infra notes 300-02 and accompanying text (discussing the
relationship between novelty in computing techniques and the competitive arts).
41. See, e.g., Del Gallo, supra note 10, at 405-11 (outlining the history of the business
method exception and related judicial decisions and tracing the origins back to Hotel Secu-
rity Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2nd Cir. 1908)).
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methods 2 as improper subject matter.43 In fact, the actual holdings do
precisely the opposite, basing their decisions on alternative,
case-specific grounds, primarily obviousness considerations.4 At best,
therefore, the exception rests on an ill-defined intuitive sense that patent
protection is generally inappropriate. 5 At worst, it improperly over-
extrapolates from the series of particular offerings to conclude that
every claim to a business method must lack sufficient innovation.4
Unfortunately, the dramatic jettisoning of the exception in State
Street Bank47 appears equally devoid of satisfactory explanation.4 ' The
opinion boldly states that "[s]ince the 1952 Patent Act, business meth-
ods have been, and should have been, subject to the same legal
requirements for patentability as applied to any other process or
42. It is worth noting that the cases do not themselves differentiate between the various
possible kinds of business methods. See supra note 3, 31-37 and accompanying text. For
example, Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2nd Cir. 1908) involves a
method for reducing internal theft, a competitive arts internal business organization strategy.
In contrast, the Loew's Drive-In Theatres Inc. v. Park-In theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d 547 (1st
Cir. 1949) drive-in movie method seems more properly classified as a service. Calling both
"methods of doing business" and creating a blanket exception, completely ignores the possi-
bility that the two types of inventions may require substantially different analysis to
determine whether they are appropriate subject matter. See supra note 38.
43. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Del Gallo, supra note 10, at 435-36.
44. See State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375-76; Del Gallo, supra note 10, at 435-36.
But see, Stern, supra note 5, at 124-25; Thomas, supra note 2, at 26 (both noting that the
CAFC all but ignores the statement in In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1994),
that appears to confirm the business method exception). In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1541, notes
with apparent approval that another case (In re Maucorps, 609 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1979))
had "dealt with a business methodology" which did not fall within § 101. The Maucorps
panel had, however, actually decided the issue on mathematical algorithm grounds without
reference to the business method exception. Maucorps, 609 F.2d at 486. Therefore, State
Street Bank is correct that there is no actual holding supporting the business method excep-
tion. In all events, neither Maucorps nor Alappat offer any rationale for the exception's
existence.
45. Not without justification, however, as the policy analysis below demonstrates in
reaching the same conclusion, at least regarding the competitive arts. See infra notes 88-174
and accompanying text.
46. The concern, however, is not without some merit. Given the long history of com-
merce and the related methods, one does have to question whether anything truly new
remains to be developed. Cf. Merges, supra note 5; Thomas, supra note 2, at 31-32 (both
noting that most business methods have a long and venerable heritage). But the entirely
correct observation that the vast majority of competitive arts ideas are unlikely to be new
does not preclude the possibility of any innovation. In fact, in such circumstances, the crea-
tion of something new may be particularly valuable. The appropriate way to deal with the
concern is, therefore, to ensure the novelty and non-obviousness gatekeepers properly func-
tion. See infra notes 127-40 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of this
implementation).
47. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
48. See Stern, supra note 5, at 123-26, 154; Thomas, supra note 2, at 26-27.
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method." 9 However, the sole support for this conclusion appears to be
the lack of actual precedent for a business method exception." It seems
logically insufficient, even if technically correct, to abandon a generally
accepted limitation merely because it rests on a long line of dicta. Some
explanation of why such a long-held view failed to conform to patent
law policies was in order. Perhaps the court intended the analytical loop
to be closed by the earlier, but not directly connected, reference 5' to the
Supreme Court's much cited opinion in Diamond v. Chakrabarty52 stat-
ing the Patent Act53 was meant to include "anything under the sun that is
made by man."' Because the Patent Act does not itself exclude business
method innovations (circularly defining the applicable § 101 category of
"processes" merely as "a process, art or method"),55 no room exists for a
judicially created exception which conflicts with the expansive scope
intended by Congress. 6
Arguing that the courts should interpret the Patent Act based exclu-
sively on Congressional intent57 does not hold up under scrutiny,
particularly in the statutory subject matter context. The Patent Act does
not stand in isolation. Congress's ability to give § 101 statutory subject
49. 149 F.3d at 1375.
50. Id. at 1375-77; see also supra notes 41, 44.
51. See State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373.
52. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
53. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994).
54. State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373 (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting
the language of the Senate Report 1979, S. REP. No. 1979, at 5 (1952), accompanying the
1952 Patent Act)).
55. 35 U.S.C. § 100 (1994).
56. See State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373 ("Thus, it is improper to read limitations
into § 101 on the subject matter that may be patented where the legislative history indicates
that Congress clearly did not intend such limitations." (citing to Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at
308)). Another possibility is that the decision has been over-read regarding the business
method exception. For example, the concluding line of State Street Bank states: "[w]hether
the claims are directed to subject matter within § 101 should not turn on whether the claimed
subject matter does 'business' instead of something else." 149 F.3d at 1377. A much nar-
rower and less controversial reading therefore might be that State Street Bank merely
reinforces the point made in In re Johnston that because the invention applies to business
activity does not render an otherwise patentable invention non-statutory subject matter. See
hz re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765, 771, rev'd on other grounds, sub nom. Dann v. Johnston, 425
U.S. 219 (1976). The court, however, only cites to Johnston in State Street Bank to note the
Court's refusal to address "the section 101 argument" (149 F.3d at 1375 n. 12) and such a
reading would be consistent with the frontal assault on the doctrine found at the outset of the
State Street opinion's discussion of the business method exception. See 149 F.3d at 1375
("We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception to rest").
57. There is, of course, arguably a difference between interpreting the words in the stat-
ute as they are found and overlaying Congressional intent in performing that exercise. But as
the broadest reading is all that need concern us for this purpose, and it is consistent with both
approaches, the debate over the appropriate method of judicial interpretation can be left for
another day.
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matter the scope articulated in the much quoted legislative history is
constrained by the Constitutional limitations on Congressional power.""
As it turns out, the source of that power, the Patent Clause, expressly
restricts legislative action to "promot[ing] the Progress of [the] ... use-
ful Arts."59 Consequently, despite the justifiable conclusion that
Congress acted with expansive intent," the language of § 101 of the Pat-
ent Act, and specifically the reach of the word "process," must be
interpreted by the courts as "terms of art ' 6 constrained by the "useful
Arts" Constitutional focus. 2
Determining the scope of the useful arts, and specifically whether it
includes the competitive arts, is hardly a straight-forward task. The
words "useful arts" are simultaneously limiting and expansive. They are
not only indeterminate, but also undefined in the Constitution. Many
commentators have, therefore, despaired of finding any meaningful
content.6 3 However, difficulty does not, at least as a Constitutional mat-
ter, permit us to simply ignore the line-drawing exercise. To read out
any limitation means virtually all human activities, if properly claimed,
become patentable subject matter.6 This clearly cannot be the case. The
Framers deliberately put the words into the Constitution. The thoughtful
debate between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison over the need to
limit monopolies gave rise to the compromise reflected in the Intellec-
tual Property Clause.65 Moreover, that general desire for circumspection
58. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966); Chiappetta, Article of
Manufacture, supra note 8, at 127-9; Robert A. Kreiss, Patent Protection for Computer
Programs and Mathematical Algorithms: The Constitutional Limitations on Patentable Sub-
ject Matter, 29 N.M. L. REv. 31, 58-59 (1999); Merges, supra note 5, at 587; Samuelson,
supra note 30, at 1033 n.24; Thomas, supra note 2, at 33-34.
59. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. The position that the preamble to the Intellectual Prop-
erty Clause limits Congressional power is not, however, undisputed. See, e.g., Eldred v.
Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 377-78 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding the preamble language does not limit
Congressional power to enact the copyright laws). In all events, even if Congressional power
is not so limited, it still merits policy inquiry to determine whether or not business methods
should be covered by the patent laws. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text; see also Chiappetta, Article of
Manufacture, supra note 8, at 135-37.
61. See Kreiss, supra note 58, at 56-57 (pointing out that the words of the Patent Statute
must be read in their specific context as "terms of art").
62. See supra note 58.
63. Professor Merges captures the problem well noting that the clause "provides no
built-in limits." Merges, supra note 5, at 584; see also Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 276, Stem,
supra note 5, at 128-29.
64. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 5, at 587; Thomas, supra note 2, at 32-34 (providing a
number of interesting examples of recent patents).
65. Jefferson argued against any exclusivity, reflecting the English experience leading
to the Statute of Monopolies. Madison eventually convinced him of the appropriateness of
limited exclusive rights to promote desirable social progress. See Graham v. John Deere Co.,
383 U.S. 1, 5-10 (1966); Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra note 8, at 97-99;
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is further emphasized by the provision's own juxtaposition of the
"useful Arts" and "Science."" The words clearly were intended to create
some restrictions. Inclusio unis, exclusio altris leaves us with no alter-
native but to search for a rational basis on which to distinguish between
the patentable and unpatentable across the wide range of human created
processes, including manufacturing methods, ways of doing business,
sports moves, formulas for creating literary, musical or other artistic
works, legal systems for resolving our differences, political systems for
managing our affairs and how to live our lives to increase our happiness
and, perhaps, to save our souls.
The courts have struggled to identify appropriate limits. The early
decisions, including the Supreme Court's seminal attempt to deal with
process patenting in Cochrane v. Deener,67 focused on the need for some
form of physical structure, transformation or effects which characterized
early technological advance.6 This approach, however, ran into (and
caused) substantial difficulties with the arrival of the Information
Age. As electronics (particularly computing) made human innovation
increasingly intangible, 9 the physicality hook became highly problem-
atic.70 After a long and difficult struggle,7' it has been largely
Merges, supra note 5, at 585-586; Robert P. Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper
Scope of the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 46-48, 57-58 (2000);
Thomas, supra note 2, at 33-34.
66. The preamble to the Intellectual Property Clause reads "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts." U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8, cl. 8. This language has been consistently
read in the parallel 18th Century style to separately justify the copyright laws (science,
authors and writings) and the patent laws (useful arts, inventors and discoveries). Unless this
structure is meant to imply some relevant difference exists between the two targeted subject
matters it would make much more sense to simply list all activities under a single inclusive
label and let Congress decide if differences might exist. See Chiappetta, Article of Manufac-
ture, supra note 8, at 129-30.
67. 94 U.S. 780 (1876); Del Gallo, supra note 10, at 409 n.29.
68. See Del Gallo, supra note 10, at 408-411; Thomas, supra note 2, at 12-14.
69. Intangibility is very different from abstraction. The former simply means the inven-
tion cannot be touched (or at the extreme, physically perceived) by human beings. The latter,
embodied in the abstract idea exception, addresses the level of generality at which the idea is
expressed. It is important not to confuse the two as they have very different ramifications in
patent law. Intangibility creates problems of objective verification. Is something really there?
Abstraction raises concerns about premature and extensive exclusivity interfering with the
very innovation the patent laws are designed to promote. See infra notes 127-40 (discussing
the need for objective verification), 144-47 and accompanying text (discussing the abstract
idea exception).
70. See Merges, supra note 5, at 586; Thomas, supra note 2, at 13-15.
71. See Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra note 8, at 106-20 (reviewing the
history of software patentability, including the Freeman-Walter-Abele "physicality" test).
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jettisoned . This evolution has, however, left behind a general sense of
congruence between the "useful arts" and the "technological arts."73
Although there is doctrinal legitimacy in such an approach, 74 re-
placing the "useful Arts" with the "technological arts" merely shifts the
inquiry from one indeterminate phrase to another.7 5 Professor John
Thomas has offered an interesting resolution using "philosophical"
thinking regarding the nature of technology to help draw the relevant
limitations.76 He concludes that technology is bounded by "production
or transformation of artifacts through the systematic manipulation of
physical forces," ' and its conception as "a form of rational and system-
atic knowledge, oriented towards efficiency and capable of being
assessed through objective criteria."78 He argues that these attributes are
properly captured, and the scope of the patent laws effectively and ap-
propriately limited, by equating the technological arts with the
"industrial arts," a term with a long history in other patent regimes.
7 9
There are a number of satisfactory arguments for adopting such an
approach to defining proper patent law scope. First, this interpretation is
consistent with the Framers' historical and philosophical context, and,
therefore, likely bears a relationship to what they had in mind when cre-
ating the Congressional authority. Such a reading of the useful Arts
reduces the threat that the patent power could be used to create naked
72. State Street Bank started the move by expressly rejecting application of the Free-
man-Walter-Abele test to questions of statutory subject matter. State Street Bank & Trust Co.
v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The decision in
AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999), finished the job,
finding that physical transformation "is not an invariable requirement" and that "physical
limitations analysis seems of little value" in light of the "useful, concrete and tangible result"
test. Id. at 1358-60; see also Thomas, supra note 2, at 29 (noting the "abrupt end to the
physical transformation standard").
73. See Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra note 8, at 129-30. Cf Kreiss, supra
note 58, at 62 and n.230 (citing other authorities but not expressly adopting the position).
74. A variety of CAFC judges have expressly articulated the position. See Application
of Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970); Application of Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997,
1003-04 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (Rich, J., concurring); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1552-53 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (Archer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Professor Chisum and
others support the view. See DONALD S. CHISUM, 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY § 1.01, Glossary at 23 (Supp. 2000); Chiappetta, Article of
Manufacture, supra note 8, at 129-30; Samuelson, supra note 30, at-1033 n.24; Thomas,
supra note 2, at 4, 32-37 (noting the definitional problem and going the further step of at-
tempting to define the technological arts).
75. See Stem, supra note 5, at 128.
76. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 36-37.
77. Id. at 7. This description, however, retains too much connection to the "physical" to
be fully workable in the Information Age. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text;
infra note 136.
78. Thomas, supra note 2, at 7.
79. Id. at 50-57. He notes, however, that such an approach may not solve all the prob-
lems. Id. at 57.
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privilege monopolies, the undesirability of which was made vivid by the
English experience."0 Rather, as appropriate to the historical context of
the rising Industrial Revolution, it limits application to fostering in-
vestment in, and importation of, the new tools and products which drive
economic prosperity.8 Second, this approach provides the clear division
between the "useful Arts" and "Science" necessary to keep the differing
patent and copyright regimes from encroaching upon one another.82 The
industrial arts offers a clear distinction between functional activities
capable of objective assessment (the "useful Arts" interpreted as the
"technological arts") and those which inform or entertain and may in-
volve more subjective judgments of value ("Science" read as knowledge
transmitted through the "expressive arts"). 3 Additionally, the refine-
ments of the industrial arts concept generated by its long history of
application in other jurisdictions may reduce administrative costs.m Al-
though disputes will continue over specifics, the array of precedent
provides firmer guidance in their resolution than a general admonition
that the activity be "useful" or "technological." Finally, the industrial
arts limitations generally fall in line with our intuitive sense of patent-
able innovation.85 This is not particularly surprising given that those
intuitions rest on the same history which supports the industrial arts ap-
proach. Nonetheless, it does mean outcomes will generally conform to
expectations, avoiding the dislocations of what appears to be unpredict-
able application.
As important as doctrine, Founders' intent, history, administration
and intuition may be (especially when they point in the same direction),
they do not speak to the normative validity of the conclusions they gen-
erate. No absolute mandate exists that the Founders' context or even
their intent should dictate our current view of the proper reach of patent
law. As intelligent and forward-looking as Jefferson and Madison were,
they could hardly have envisioned claims to intangible technologies like
80. See supra note 65.
81. Id. Professor Merges wonderfully captures the spirit of that time: 'Everyone knew
that manufactures and machines were at the core of the patent system .... At the very least,
for Jefferson, if you put technology in a bag and shook it, it would make some noise."
Merges, supra note 5, at 585.
82. See supra note 66; infra notes 100-07.
83. The division reflects the line drawn by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Selden, 101
U.S. 99 (1879). This same line has been more precisely formulated by Professor Dennis
Karjala in his writings concerning the appropriate division between patent and copyright
protection of software. See infra notes 100-107 and accompanying text.
84. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 50-54.
85. Id. at 58.
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software,86 to say nothing of the Internet's global virtual marketplace.'7
Similarly our doctrinal efforts to draw limitations and our intuitions, as
products of this same history and context, may rest on flawed assump-
tions which have failed to keep pace with changes in society. Therefore,
even though the convincing case for the industrial arts approach to pat-
ent law makes competitive arts innovation appear an unlikely candidate
for coverage, the important question remains whether support can be
found in the policy objectives driving United States patent law. If so, it
is well within our power to ignore the Framers' context and intent,
modernize our intuitions, update our doctrine and, if necessary, amend
the Constitution.
The policy approach requires descending the analytical tree to first
principles. Specifically, we must start with a clear articulation of the
normative justifications for the United States patent system --unless
we know where we are trying to go, it is unlikely we will get there."
The justifications can be briefly summarized as follows: A competitive
market is the preferred economic engine." When properly operating,
such a market generates a steady stream of aggregate social wealth-
enhancing innovation as the participants seek to maximize their per-
sonal return by gaining competitive advantage.9' Such advantage can be
obtained through identification and control of physical resources and by
86. Which, absent a carrying medium, cannot even be put in a paper bag and shaken,
much less make any noise. See supra note 81.
87. Like ourselves, the Founders were products of their own environment and their de-
cisions reflect the world they knew and the choices they were required to make. See
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAws OF CYBERSPACE 149-50 (1999).
88. As Godel pointed out, there really are no first principles in analysis, just first as-
sumptions. As discussed in the text, United States patent law assumes a social organization
that starts from a free-market economy baseline and adjusts from there. If that assumption
fails, then we need to re-enter the discussion from the analytical starting point provided by
the new social model. See Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability ofAgreeing to Disagree: The
WTO, TRIPS, International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L.
333, 375-81 (2000) (discussing alternative views of the social compact and the effects on
intellectual property rights) [hereinafter Chiappetta, Agreeing to Disagree].
89. See Chiappetta, Myth, supra note 11, at 73.
90. See, e.g., Raskind, supra note 5, at 71. For doubters that United States law starts
from this point, the passage of the antitrust laws in 1890 and 1914 provide strong empirical
evidence of the desire to let Adam Smith's invisible hand free to work its magic. See, e.g.,
PHILLIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 8, 45-47 (Aspen 5th ed. 1997).
This is not to say that we do not make incursions to interject other values through, for exam-
ple, redistributional taxes, regulatory regimes and even government ownership. Cf id. at 8-
9,25.
91. Specifically, productive efficiency rewards the most innovative producers and allo-
cative efficiency directs innovation toward consumer preferences. See AREEDA, supra note
90, at 17. Adam Smith made this self-interest acceptable by arguing that such otherwise
"greedy" instincts would be properly channeled by the invisible hand of the competitive
marketplace to benefit society as a whole. See generally, ADAIt STUTH, WEALTH OF NATIONS
(Edwin Cannan ed., 6th ed., Methuem & Co. LTD, 1950).
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developing and implementing ideas for new products, services and the
means for manufacturing and delivering them ("intellectual products").
Valuable physical resources can be controlled, and related advan-
tage obtained, through possession, thus generating incentives to invest
in their rapid identification and acquisition. Taking from competitors
offers one particularly efficient means for accomplishing this task.
However, the related deleterious effects on social order and incentives
to investment in original resource identification and improvement re-
quired legal intervention through real and personal property laws.'
The intangible nature of intellectual products eliminates the disrup-
tive "taking" rivalry by making mutual, simultaneous possession
possible.93 However, non-rivalrous possession generates its own special
set of problems.' Unlike physical resources, mere continued possession
does not ensure competitive advantage. A competitor might independ-
ently create the same idea. Or the idea might be duplicated by observing
its use, thereby reducing, or entirely avoiding, the associated develop-
ment costs and time delays. The likelihood that innovation might
quickly spawn disastrous lower-cost competition causes the basic mar-
ket incentives for idea innovation to fail. The result is under-investment
in social wealth-enhancing intellectual product innovation. The solution
to this "public goods" problem again lies in legal intervention. Specifi-
cally, a patent creates artificial scarcity through the legal right to
prevent any use, including by competitors, of an innovation,95 and thus
permits the innovator to profit from the invention's value in the market
for a period of time sufficient to restore appropriate incentives to in-
vest.96 At the end of that period, the innovation becomes available for
use by others under the normal rules of the competitive marketplace.
92. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 36-39 (5th ed. 1998).
93. Thomas Jefferson's eloquent observation sums it up: "He who receives an idea from
me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine,
receives light without darkening me." VI Writings of Thomas Jefferson 180-181 (H.A.
Washington ed., 1814).
94. For additional elaboration of the discussion following in the text, see Chiappetta,
Myth, supra note 11, at 86-87; Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra note 8, at 98.
95. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994). United States patent law, unlike copyright law, provides
virtually no exceptions to the patent holder's right to prevent use by others. See Stem, supra
note 5, at 138; Thomas, supra note 2, at 5.
96. Precisely as contemplated in the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution.
See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. Although the Framers did not perform any cost-benefit
analysis, Jefferson and Madison clearly understood the market incentive failure and the need
for intervention. See Chiappetta, Myth, supra note 11, at 86 n. 112. There is no convincing
evidence that any deliberate determination has been made that the current 20 year patent
term actually corresponds to the level of incentive necessary to produce maximally efficient
levels of investment. See supra note 11; infra note 112 and accompanying text.
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This policy framework provides important guidance regarding the
appropriate reach of the patent lawsf Patent law replaces the
self-interested competitive motivations to innovate in a properly
functioning market with the self-interested inducements of legal control.
However, despite the appeal in both cases to self-interest, the objective
remains increased aggregate wealth for the benefit of the society as a
whole.98 Consequently, advocating an extension -of the scope of patent
protection to the competitive arts based on claims of inventors' natural
rights (whether based on just rewards for labor, personal stake or
otherwise) is misplaced. 99
Additionally, patent law reflects no more than a grudging exception
to the preferred competitive market model. Therefore, it should be care-
fully limited to resolving only the identified market failure and the
resulting distortion of incentives to desirable innovation which justifies
its existence. Going further risks insulating competitors from the desir-
able rigors of market competition, limits alternative uses and causes
interference with efficient aggregate wealth maximization. Reflecting
this important constraint, patent law incorporates a number of require-
ments intended to ensure actual benefits and avoid unjustified costs,
including the twin tests of innovation, novelty and non-obviousness
(which ensure "progress"); utility (which, among other things, requires
the invention actually produces the claimed result); and the obligation
of description and enablement (which facilitates improvements as well
as post-term entry of the invention into the competitive market).
Similarly, the primary (if not exclusive) role of the subject matter
requirement is to ensure proper targeting and application of the patent
incentive. Professor Dennis Karjala's excellent discussion of the appro-
priate application of patent and copyright law in the software context
97. Whether the economic market theory supporting the patent system actually works is
another question. Even if it does, there is no guarantee that it works in the same fashion in
every instance, a key point in this analysis. See supra note 11 (noting the conclusions
reached regarding competitive arts patenting are actually reinforced by the uncertainty);
infra Parts II, III. Cf Merges, supra note 5, at 584-85 (noting early Congressional "blind
technological optimism" and the resulting "one size fits all" patent law).
98. The courts have consistently noted this important aspect of United States patent and
copyright law. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (making the point in the copy-
right law context).
99. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (noting Jefferson's rejection
of natural rights theories); DONALD S. CHISUI, ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 46-47
(1998). Nothing prevents recognizing these arguments as a normative matter, in fact many
nations do so. See Chiappetta, Agreeing to Disagree, supra note 88, at 376-81. To do so in
this context, however, conflicts with the basic assumption that utility based patent law is a
given and the question is whether coverage should be extended to the competitive arts, not
whether to reassess our society's value structure. Although the latter objective merits serious
consideration it is well beyond the scope of this much more modest inquiry.
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clearly demonstrates this vital function of each regime's subject matter
requirements.'O As he points out, these two regimes offer very different
incentives reflecting substantially different policy objectives and bal-
ances. Patent law predominately reflects a market focus, granting
powerful, but carefully circumscribed, protection, providing essentially
absolute exclusivity regarding the core innovation while avoiding sub-
stantial barriers to incremental innovation."' In contrast, copyright law
"originality" requires less innovation, provides deliberately broader
protection against derivative works, but offers only significantly more
nuanced rights and remedies reflecting, in part, its additional non-
market free-speech concerns and, in part, a desire to avoid significant
impediments to subsequent functional innovation. 2
Subject matter limitations provide the vehicle for avoiding inappro-
priate application of each regime's incentives.103 Specifically, copyright
law expressly channels functional processes to patent law, statutorily
and through the idea-expression and useful article doctrines," 4 subject-
ing them to that regime's rigorous, but primarily market economic,
policy balances.' 5 Those which "inform, entertain or portray appear-
ances,"' 06 remain subject to the more complex trade-offs between market
economics and other countervailing policy considerations drawn under
copyright law.'07 Within this inter-regime "channeling" structure, there
100. See Karijala, A Coherent Theory, supra note 14, at 56-57, 60-62; Dennis S. Kar-
jala, The Relative Roles of Patent and Copyright in the Protection of Computer Programs, 17
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 41, 44-50 (1998) [hereinafter Karijala, The Relative
Roles].
101. See Karjala, The Relative Roles, supra note 100, at 44-50; see also Mark A.
Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REv. 989,
1000-13 (1997) (providing a detailed description of patent law's approach to improve-
ments).
102. See Karijala, The Relative Roles, supra note 100, at 44-50; see also Lemley, supra
note 101, at 1013-29 (describing copyright law's approach to improvements, including the
special role of fair use).
103. See id. Professor Reichman notes that this historical separation (in his taxonomy
between the "general product markets" protected by patent law and "cultural products" pro-
tected by copyright law) has been broken down by the technological changes of the
Information Age. His conclusion that a new hybrid regime is required, however, remains
consistent with the need for continued separation of patent and copyright law. See Reichman,
Charting, supra note 14, at 480-485, 512-520.
104. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) (precluding protection for processes and methods);
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (precluding protection for useful articles); see also Stem, supra note
5, at 112-14 (discussing the idea-expression channeling approach taken in Baker v. Selden,
101 U.S. 99 (1879), as adopted by § 102(b) of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(1994)).
105. See Karijala, The Relative Roles, supra note 100, at 45-47 (further defining the
content of "functional" innovations).
106. Id. at 46.
107. See id. The division between functional and "expressive" (my word, not Professor
Karala's) works mirrors the division drawn by Professor Reichman between general prod-
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is little problem identifying patent law as an appropriate regime for
competitive arts functional innovation.
Channeling, however, only partially reflects the role of the subject
matter requirements. Proper assignment of an innovation to patent or
copyright law does not automatically demonstrate that it deserves
protection. Before the appropriate regime's additional requirements are
applied, the subject matter limitations provide one. final, but critical,
basis for disqualification.' Given the general policy bias in favor of an
unfettered competitive market, the proponent of protection bears the
burden of demonstrating that for the particular class of innovation ap-
plying the incentive will spur supplemental innovation l 9 and that overall
the resulting benefits likely will outweigh the costs of granting protec-
tion."0
Therefore, the final subject matter policy decision concerning the
patentability of the competitive arts inexorably calls for actual empirical
testing."' Unfortunately, although the number of studies continues to
grow, to date they fall to resolve even the general case for the patent
incentive either way."2 Not surprisingly, the relative newness of com-
ucts market goods and cultural goods. See Reichman, Charting, supra note 14, at 483-84,
489, 513. The latter approach, however, does not offer nearly as clear a distinction. Quite
clearly copyright law envisions that cultural innovations will also be commercially exploited,
otherwise the market incentive would have no value. Trying to draw a line between cultural
"art" and commercial "art" is equally problematic. Better to look at the primary objective of
the innovation: functionality or expression. It is worth noting that this dividing line may
preclude patenting of certain commercial commodities (for example when their only purpose
is to entertain) and permit patenting of methods used in the cultural arts (like a method of
painting-by numbers for example) as the purpose is functional. The inability to objectively
verify the educational, entertainment or edifying results of non-functional innovations fur-
ther supports the "functional--expression" channeling approach. See infra notes 136, 140
and accompanying text.
108. There is no requirement that every innovation be protected in some fashion. See
Stem, supra note 5, at 153.
109. See Raskind, supra note 5, at 77 (noting the need to demonstrate that the incentive
is necessary).
110. See id. at 73-74 (noting the problems of deadweight loss resulting from freeing a
competitor from normal market forces). Cf Merges, supra note 5, at 584 (noting the need to
address the related costs).
111. See Raskind, supra note 5, at 77-78 (also noting potential difficulties with "pure"
utility theory itself); Thomas, supra note 2, at 35-36 (noting the paucity of data).
112. The theory remains a powerful anecdotal force but there is at least growing suspi-
cion regarding its operation in practice. In all events, after over 200 years of looking at the
issue, no firm conclusions can be reached. See Comments of Josh Lerner, PTO Panel Dis-
cusses Incentives Driving E-Commerce and Business Method Patents, Computer & Internet
LawCast available at http://www.lawcast.com) (Aug. 14, 2000); supra note 11. Professor
Raskind discusses one interesting study, which appears to demonstrate that broad patent
protection can substantially impede technological progress. See Raskind, supra note 5, at
73-77. This does not, however, indicate that all patenting has this effect, merely that a more
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petitive arts patenting means an even greater paucity of data and inde-
terminacy."' In this environment, theoretical modeling provides an
important tool for understanding the direction the empirical work should
take. In particular, any empirical study must carefully define and ar-
ticulate the hypotheses being tested, an undertaking which serves as the
focus of the remainder of this section and the entirety of the next."4
Examining the latest judicial word on statutory subject matter, the
CAFC's "useful, tangible and concrete result" test,"5 provides an excel-
lent starting point for framing an appropriate hypothesis concerning
competitive arts patents as the right stuff. Professor Thomas' analysis of
the CAFC's application of that test in State Street Bank reveals a serious
problem and points towards its resolution."6 The flaw lies in the opin-
ion's apparent insouciant conflation of the patentable subject matter
limitation with the historically separate (and minimal) utility require-
ment."7 Although a semantically tidy fit, such a test offers a virtually
unconstrained reach of the patent incentive."8 Almost any process can
be described in a way which demonstrates that it confers an articulable
specific utility."9 An industrial process produces a particular product.
The State Street Bank system produces profit and loss allocations. A
high-jumping technique produces superior height. A political process
generates appropriate resolution of social issues. A process for living
one's life provides a clear conscience, greater happiness or salvation.
Under such an approach, as the decision implies, only laws of
nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas2' are likely to be
refined approach than the current one size fits all regime is required. This Article comes to
exactly that conclusion regarding the appropriate hypothesis regarding the competitive arts.
113. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 35-36 and Raskind, supra note 5, at 78, noting the
absence of empirical work regarding business patents; see also Lerner, supra note 2, at 34-
36 (noting the increase in filings and grants but no evidence regarding the incentive effect
itself).
114. The working hypothesis generated by theoretical analysis is especially important
when the empirical work either is a long time in coming or never occurs, as it provides the
only basis for action. Cf Thomas, supra note 2, at 35-36 (noting the apparent disinclination
to research the topic). See infra Part IV ( setting out a number interim actions deemed appro-
priate even absent empirical verification to ensure patenting does not over-protect the
competitive arts).
115. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1359-60 (Fed.
Cir. 1999); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)(en banc).
116. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 22-27.
117. Id. at26-27.
118. See id. at 33; Merges, supra note 5, at 588.
119. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 33 ("almost any sort of communicable practice
seems easily attainable.").
120. Abstract ideas overlap to some extent with the problem of inadequate descrip-
tion/enablement under § 112. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). See infra notes 144-47. In both cases,
2000-20011
312 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 7:289
excluded. 12' And even these exclusions rest on specific antecedent Su-
preme Court interpretations, not a restriction imposed by the specific
utility test. 122
This difficulty can be avoided by focusing on the additional re-
quirements of the CAFC's test. It is not sufficient that the result be
"useful." It must also be "tangible and concrete." The court's own at-
tempts to further clarify in State Street Bank, however, are constrained
by the fact that the specific words were not well chosen. Clearly, the
court did not mean that the financial allocations were literally tangible
and concrete. Moreover, the court certainly recognized, particularly in a
software case, that the tangible/intangible line had long ago lost its
power to draw the necessary distinctions regarding patentable subject
matter.'25 The opinion expressly recognizes the problem, avoiding the
specific meaning of the words inherited from Alappat24 and opting in-
stead to focus more generally on "the essential characteristics of the
subject matter, in particular, its practical utility" (emphasis added).'
2 S
Although this effort indicates an intention to require more than a spe-
cific utility (or at least permits that inference), it does not provide
adequate guidance as to precisely what that something more might be.'
26
Supplementing the CAFC's notion of practical utility with Professor
Thomas' recognition of the importance of objective assessment in the
the fundamental problem is the same: giving too much exclusionary power to the patentee
compared to the scope of the actual invention.
121. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group. Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
122. These exceptions exist doctrinally because the Supreme Court has said so. See
Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra note 8, at 130-33 (discussing the exceptions). An
appropriate definition of the useful arts should, however, explain why the exclusions are
good policy. The "usefulness" as "specific benefit" test cannot do so. A law of nature is just
as beneficial as any other process. For example, F=ma and E=mc2 not only do what they
claim but the result of the computation is extremely useful to know. Natural phenomena and
abstract ideas are similarly "useful" as there is clear benefit in knowing that things like hy-
drogen or magnetism exist and have certain properties or in being pointed in the proper
direction by an idea such as placing an eraser on the end of a pencil. In each case, the actual
concern is not lack of value (or usefulness), but too little value compared to the costs. See
id.; infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
124. The court picks up, and is therefore constrained by, the phrasing of the test from
the earlier Alappat en bane decision which it, quite properly, used as guiding precedent.
State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373.
125. Id. at 1375. The State Street Bank court makes a similar explanatory effort when
first introducing the test. See id. at 1373.
126. The court's own unconvincing attempts to apply the test to the facts in State Street
Bank and to its earlier decisions demonstrates the difficulty. See Chiappetta, Article of
Manufacture, supra note 8, at 133 n.229. Cf. Thomas, supra note 2, at 26 (noting the confla-
tion of useful arts with utility).
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patenting process provides the answer.' 27 The CAFC has expressly rec-
ognized that actual patentability rests on additional constraints
contained in § 102, § 103 and § 112.'2 It failed, however, to note that
the policy gate-keeping function of the subject matter requirement in-
cludes ensuring proper application of these other limitations.29 As
Professor Thomas notes,30 for the patent system to work properly, what-
ever comes through the patentable subject matter filter needs to exhibit
the characteristics which actually permit us to determine if claims
"satisf[y] the other requirements for patentability."'' 3' Only then can we
be comfortable that the innovation merits the "embarrassment to the
public of granting a patent.'
'132
Armed with this understanding, the CAFC's "useful, tangible and
concrete results" and "practical utility" patentable subject matter tests
can now be properly interpreted and applied. The requirement goes be-
yond the isolated, but essential, § 101 need to distinguish inchoate
abstract ideas from actual applications.33 It also demands the ability to
objectively determine three things: (1) that the invention has been im-
plemented as specified, (2) that the specified result is actually present
after implementation, and (3) that the result was caused by that imple-
mentation. Only innovations with these characteristics permit the
necessary confirmation that specific utility'3 and description/
127. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 54 (noting the issue in connection with innovations
involving aesthetics and personal skill).
128. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
1999); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
129. The approach helps mitigate valid concerns expressed by other commentators that
the patent system is simply not up to the task of applying the § 102 and § 103 requirements
to new forms of innovation. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 268-69. Although objective
verification helps, other actions must still be taken to ensure proper operation regarding the
competitive arts. See id.; infra notes 223-56 and accompanying text.
130. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 54 (discussing problems with patenting matters in-
volving aesthetics or personal skill, stating that "We also appear to lack objective
mechanisms for evaluating this subject matter in light of the requisites of patentability.").
131. AT&Tv. Excel, 172 F.3d at 1361.
132. See Jefferson, supra note 93.
133. See AT&Tv. Excel, 172 F.3d at 1357; State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373.
134. The CAFC's "practical utility" test for patentable subject matter, therefore, does
closely relate to traditional specific utility. However, they remain a distinct requirement. The
practical utility requirement of objective verification permits the necessary testing for spe-
cific utility (most particularly in the sense the invention produces what it claims to).
Together, not individually, these requirements make an invention "useful" in the sense meant
by the patent laws. Cf Karjala, The Relative Roles, supra note 100, at 45-46 (noting that
patent law usefulness (functionality in his taxonomy) should not be confused.with the gen-
eral term "useful" because to do so would incorporate a wide range of extremely expressive
works which more properly belong under the copyright regime); Stem, supra note 5, at 127
(noting such an equivalence leads to a search for a division between the useful and the "not
useful" arts).
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enablement'35 are present.36 And only if these requirements are satisfied
can we have any confidence that there are actual benefits to offset the
costs of applying the patent incentive to the class of invention.
13 7
135. The objective verification requirement ensures proper application of the descrip-
tion/enablement requirement. If a sufficient description/enablement required aesthetic or
other subjective judgments or application of personal skill, there can be no assurance that the
invention contributed any advance in market performance. For example, telling people to
think like Albert Einstein, paint like Leonardo Da Vinci, or to play golf like Tiger Woods
adds nothing to the market's performance. Although these claims certainly would be at-
tacked as "abstract ideas," the subject matter problem (whether labeled "abstract idea" or
something else) is that without any means to objectively verify, it is impossible to determine
if the desired result was produced, and if so, whether it resulted from proper implementation
of the invention or something else.
136. The objective verification requirement, not surprisingly, aligns nicely with Profes-
sor Thomas' focus on the characteristics of technology. It is, after all, his observation
concerning the importance of objective verification which supports the approach. However,
his references to the physical aspects of technology should have a much more limited role in
the subject matter inquiry. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 7, 53. Specifically, the CAFC's
observation in AT&T v. Excel that "[physical transformation] is not an invariable require-
ment, but merely one example of how a mathematical algorithm may bring about a useful
application" provides the appropriate guidance. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc.,
172 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The "tangibility" requirement of the Alappat "useful,
concrete and tangible" test should be similarly interpreted. Tangibility, including physical
transformation, when it ensures objective verification is a sufficient condition, but that does
not make it necessary. Although "concrete" can be more comfortably read as "objectively
verifiable," potentially confusing semantic associations with physicality remain. Far better to
abandon a forced reading of the conjunctive requirements of "useful, tangible and concrete"
and to interpret them as terms of art and focus directly on objective verification. Thus inter-
preted, the patent laws can, and should, comfortably extend to a variety of activities which
do not fit either our historical or intuitive sense of technology, things which in Professor
Merges' apt description make noise if put in a bag and shaken. Merges, supra note 5, at 585.
See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text (discussing the need to abandon the physical
transformation approach).
The objective verification approach to statutory subject matter does, however, raise seri-
ous questions regarding whether "entertainment" outputs from traditional technological
apparatus or composition of matter claims are sufficiently objectively verifiable to make
them patentable subject matter. See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Golden Trade, No. 92 Civ.
1667 (RPP), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4899 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (struggling with the issue of pro-
tecting a fashion statement under the patent laws). A similar issue arises regarding business
method outputs. See infra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
137. As an alternative we could eliminate all constraints other than novelty and non-
obviousness, leaving it to the market to determine whether the claimed invention produced
valuable output. Eliminating the need to objectively demonstrate utility or provide workable
description/enablement would take Professor Edmund Kitch's prospect theory to a land-rush
extreme, permitting prospectors to stake out exclusive claims to all related future activities
based merely on a showing of first to arrive in the territory. Cf Edmund Kitch, The Nature
and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcoN. 265 (1977). Just as we discovered when
the examination requirement was eliminated, the resulting cloud of patents would have a
significant adverse effect on the market. See Merges, supra note 5, at 594-96. More criti-
cally, rather than generate substantial additional innovation such a system would actually
deter subsequent innovation. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966) (discussing
the problems if utility requirements are entirely abandoned). This problem is clearly visible
in the current struggle over patenting of c-DNA sequences. Granting a patent to the first to
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The general operation of this approach to the patentable subject
matter inquiry can be demonstrated quickly. An industrial process for
curing rubber clearly qualifies. So does the software implementation of
that process. In each case, we can objectively determine that when the
specifically identified implementation occurs it results in the expected
outcome (we do or do not have properly cured rubber or a properly op-
erational computer system).'38 The profit and cost allocations generated
through the process at issue in State Street Bank can similarly be objec-
tively confirmed. In contrast, whether a political process generates
proper resolution of social issues or whether a method for living pro-
duces salvation, are substantially more problematic. Although the
specific implementation may be objectively confirmed, the output from
the first is largely subjective'39 while the second, sadly, remains inde-
terminate. Because we cannot objectively determine whether these latter
processes actually produce the identified result, there is no way to tell
whether they work as claimed. Without this minimal assurance there is
no reasonable basis to believe that applying the patent incentive has any
chance of increasing social wealth by providing benefits in excess of the
costs.
40
find (create) the sequence substantially reduces the value of, and hence incentives to, addi-
tional investment in determining specific uses. See "Riding the DNA Railroad," Interview
with Eric Lander, TECH. REv. July-Aug. 2000, at 98.
138. The software assessment, not to be confused with the underlying process being
implemented, however, should not rest on tangibility. Although one is tempted to rely on
physical manifestations (the impulses on a recording medium or in computer memory), for
reasons I explain elsewhere, this approach is improperly limiting. See Chiappetta, Article of
Manufacture, supra note 8, at 150-54. Because software "as such" can be objectively veri-
fied, both as to existence and the special purpose output it generates, it meets the patentable
subject matter requirements.
139. Cf. Thomas, supra note 2, at 54 (noting the similar subjectivity problem regarding
aesthetics and personal skill).
140. It is not coincidental that the clearest exclusions under current law (the "arts") in-
volve outputs which require taking into account non-market-economic considerations. These
situations raise special objective verification concerns. Like the aesthetic, informative, edu-
cational, entertainment or edifying value of paintings, plays, music or literature, proper
social decisions and salvation are very difficult to evaluate in traditional market terms. Cf.
Reichman, Charting, supra note 14, at 483-484, 489, 513 (discussing the "general products"
versus "cultural" line of demarcation between patent and copyright law). Some other means
must, therefore, be found to translate those considerations into not only measurable but com-
parable terms. Even if this might be accomplished using economic conceptions such as
"utility," it is far from certain that agreement could (or should) be reached that economics
represents a proper approach to resolving these "ultimate value" trade-offs. See, e.g., Chiap-
petta, Agreeing to Disagree, supra note 88, at 369 n.187, 385 n.272; Chiappetta, Myth, supra
note 11, at 93 n.154. In such cases, the better approach (reflected in current law) is to chan-
nel those innovations toward copyright law, limiting protection to the expressive elements
and leaving the ultimate value decisions to other than intellectual property law. The effect is
to limit patent law's reach to addressing the incentive to innovation problem regarding goods
and services sold in, and the means of operation of, the competitive, commercial products
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Although necessary, the objective verification requirement is not
technically sufficient to qualify a class of inventions as patentable sub-
ject matter "useful Arts" for policy purposes.' 4' It merely draws the line
between the classes of inventions which merit further consideration and
those which do not. Theoretically at least, a more precise empirical as-
sessment should still be made to confirm that the actual value of the
supplemental innovation generated exceeds the costs of obtaining it.
Although possible, the lack of necessary data, 42 the limited confidence
in the accuracy of the results and the administrative costs, to say nothing
of the need to agree on valuations, makes actually performing such an
exercise impractical. In most cases, therefore, the requirement permits
the subject matter gate-keeper only to turn-away those classes of inven-
tions which offer no possibility of confirming they make a contribution
of any kind.
In some situations, however, further theoretical modeling can help
develop appropriate interim working hypotheses regarding likely bene-
fit-cost outcomes. For example, consider the firmly entrenched law of
nature exception. Most such "laws," when articulated as a process, pro-
duce outputs with the necessary characteristics for objective
verification. For example, the process for determining acceleration, F/m
= a, or for determining the energy released from a certain quantum of
mass, E=mc2, both have eminently verifiable implementations and out-
puts. Nonetheless, it seems likely, given the nature of scientific inquiry,
that applying the patent incentive will produce relatively little incre-
mental innovation compared with the dramatic costs143 of a twenty-year
market. See supra note 107 (discussing the views of Professors Karijala and Reichman con-
cerning the proper reach of patent law); supra notes 76-79, 136 (discussing the congruence
with Professor Thomas' argument in favor of the industrial arts); infra note 141 (discussing
the limitations on the appropriateness of its application).
141. Although the objective verification test appropriately defines the "useful arts"
given the objectives and related structure of current patent law, its legitimacy only rests on
alignment with those existing goals. If those goals were to change then so, perhaps, should
the definition of the useful arts. See supra note 88. Additionally, the test may not fully com-
port with current Constitutional interpretation of the "useful Arts" limitation and may,
therefore, require some adjustments. See supra notes 57-85 and accompanying text
(discussing the definitional quandary); infra note 216 and accompanying text (noting similar
possible ramifications for a new competitive arts regime).
142. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
143. See Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra note 8, at 131-32 (discussing the
far ranging preclusive effect of granting patents on such fundamental discoveries). On the
other hand, certain types of scientific endeavor may require such enormous investments of
resources and time, or the benefits of earlier identification may be so great, that some form
of additional incentive is appropriate (for example, the recent mapping of the human
genome). In all events, on policy grounds the distinction between invention and discovery
relied on in a number of natural phenomena, law of nature cases is irrelevant. See, e.g.,
Parker v. Nook, 437 U.S. 584, 591-92 (1978); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,
Defining the Proper Scope of Internet Patents
period of exclusivity. Therefore, until empirical testing demonstrates
otherwise, the appropriate hypothesis appears to be that these types of
discoveries should not be covered by the patent incentive.
Similarly, one could argue that certain abstract ideas, such as
Morse's claim to using "electro-magnetism, however developed for
marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any dis-
tance,"' 44 meet the basic objective verification requirement; that force
can clearly be used to accomplish that purpose.145 However, protecting
generalized articulations of a principle, even when objective confirma-
tion is possible, also substantially impedes investment in developing
alternative implementations." Consequently, it seems appropriate to
hypothesize that empirical studies will reveal too little benefit for the
costs incurred in such cases and such broad patent protection should,
therefore, be denied.1
47
333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra note 8, at 131 n.219
(discussing the Constitutional use of "discoveries"). In fact, one could argue that a law of
nature is not really a discovery at all, but rather just another human invention which works in
an objectively verifiable manner like any other technology. There is no evidence that laws of
nature represent an underlying Platonic truth, just that it will accurately predict the way we
see the shadows on the wall. In all events, the same empirical question applies equally to
inventions and discoveries: will the patent incentive provide sufficiently increased
"innovation" (discovery) to offset the costs? Cf. Karjala, The Relative Roles, supra note 100,
at 60-61
144. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112 (1853).
145. At least in those cases in which some implementation is objectively enabled (as
was the case in Morse's patent which included a number of specific applications). If no ob-
jective verification can be made, then the claim does not meet the patentable subject matter
requirement in the first instance. See infra note 147.
146. See Morse, 56 U.S. at 113.
147. The objective verification requirement for patentable subject matter helps clarify
the relationship between a § 112 enablement rejection and a § 101 abstract idea subject mat-
ter rejection. Both address the problem of excessive costs, but do so in different ways. The
former turns on the actual objective confirmation that the described method falls to permit
implementation by one of ordinary skill in the art. The latter addresses claims which provide
no means to perform the necessary objective verification. In cases like Morse, where one or
more objectively verifiable enablements exist, one could view a § 101 "abstract idea" rejec-
tion as tantamount to a § 112 over-breadth rejection. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEw TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 152 (1997). The better view,
however, is that the inability to objectively verify the full operation of the "over-broad"
claim makes it unpatentable subject matter as a whole, not merely indefinite under § 112. To
illustrate, a § 112 indefiniteness rejection was appropriate in The Incandescent Lamp Patent,
159 U.S. 465 (1895), because it could be objectively confirmed that the asserted enablement
failed by inserting any of a wide variety of carbonized fibrous or textile filaments which do
not work as claimed. In contrast, a § 101 abstract idea rejection more properly applies to
Morse's claim 8, which could be neither objectively confirmed or rejected as a whole. In
abstract idea cases, although the broad form of the claim is properly treated as unpatentable
subject matter, narrower objectively verifiable claims might still be presented as proper sub-
ject matter (as they were in Morse) for testing under § 112. See Stem, supra note 5, at 117
(discussing the famous Claim 8 in O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853)).
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In other cases, the administrative costs of making necessary distinc-
tions among sub-classes may be sufficiently large to tip the balance. For
example, some political process outputs may be difficult to objectively
detect (increased social harmony, better decisions) while others permit
express measurement (enhancing citizen participation by providing the
right to vote). Distinguishing between these subclasses in practice is
likely to involve substantial effort. Because the general need for addi-
tional economic incentives to drive political system innovation of either
kind seems slight,'48 these administrative costs will likely offset what
may, at best, be very modest increases in innovation. Consequently, a
hypothesis which excludes the entire class from patent coverage seems
appropriate.' 4
This approach to patentable subject matter determinations provides
useful policy guidance in developing an appropriate hypothesis regard-
ing the patentability of the competitive arts. The gating objective
verification requirement raises significant concerns with any hypothesis
favoring coverage. The issues can best be demonstrated by an example.
Consider claims to a "one-click" on-line checkout method.' Objective
testing of claims to an over-laid computer implementation is non-
problematic. -However, this only confirms the equally non-problematic
patentability of any incorporated computing innovations. It does not
help us determine whether a separate competitive arts patent should is-
sue on the underlying one-click process itself.' That inquiry requires
independent assessment of the one-click method as a distinct patentable
process.
Although implementation of the specific one-click process steps
may be highly susceptible to objective confirmation, the difficulty lies
in defining and verifying the output. Is it direct operational cost savings,
indirect increases in overall efficiency, greater sales, customer conven-
ience and good-will, improved market image as an innovator, all of
148. Some would argue we have too much political innovation as it stands. More im-
portantly, patenting of political processes implicates a variety of non-market values such as
free speech, freedom of association and the basic franchise. In such cases, the importance of
non-market economic variables makes patent coverage inappropriate. See supra note 140
(discussing the problem of dealing with such considerations within the patent incentive
model).
149. In other situations the converse may apply, with significant risks of under invest-
ment in innovation justifying avoiding the administrative costs of making fine-grained
distinctions within the class of activity despite over-protection of the less objectively verifi-
able subclasses within a category of innovation.
150. Like those in the patent at issue in Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.coin, Inc.,
73 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (W.D. Wash. 1999), vacated by 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
151. Or whether novelty and non-obviousness in that process can provide the necessary
innovation to permit patenting of what would otherwise be an obvious computing imple-
mentation. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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these, or something else? Similar definitional issues arise in other com-
petitive arts situations such as customer profiling, stimulus triggered
banner advertising or affiliate referral processes.
Different identified outputs offer varying levels of confidence as to
whether we have an innovation subject to objective verification. Direct
cost savings can be readily measured. Using the one-click process either
reduces operation costs or it does not. A reduction in indirect or over-
head costs or an increase in sales are, however, more difficult to isolate.
Increased customer goodwill or market image are even more problem-
atic. Moreover, in the business environment, the question of causation
becomes more complicated. Even if an increase in sales or enhanced
goodwill can be demonstrated, the question remains whether it arose
from the one-click process or from another, unrelated, aspect of the
overall transaction or context.
52
Despite these concerns, the competitive arts are not isolated from
the mathematics of the Information Age. It will frequently be possible
to generate evidence which supports, with a high degree of statistical
confidence, the conclusion that implementing the one-click checkout
method actually yields the indicated specific result (whatever it might
be). Specific utility and description/enablement can, therefore, be con-
firmed and some assurance had that benefits are at least present.
Therefore, the objective verification requirement should not stand as an
absolute barrier to patentability. Rather, the increased risk that such
forms of objective verification may erroneously permit competitive arts
patents (thus freeing market participants from socially desirable compe-
tition and deterring additional investment in further exploration with no
offsetting gains in actual innovation)' 3 should weigh modestly in favor
of a working hypothesis against patentability of the competitive arts.
The next step in the analysis, however, significantly increases the
concern. Absent empirical data,"' we are left to develop an appropriate
working hypothesis concerning the likely balance between the benefits
and the costs of a pro-patenting position. There are convincing
152. It might also be questioned whether even demonstrably increased sales or good-
will arising solely from the consuming public's interest in novelty for its own sake rather
than any actual cost savings is sufficient to justify a patent. If consumers flock to the site
because it is "cool," it has utility to them for which they are willing to pay a premium. How-
ever, that utility may also have been generated by inappropriate differentiation causing an
irrational response in economic terms. Cf MERGES ET AL., supra note 147, at 527-29
(discussing the similar problem of trademark based differentiation).
153. In effect, generating the same harm as permitting patents on laws of nature or ab-
stract ideas, see supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text; or "unjustified" trademark
differentiation, see supra note 152 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (noting the newness of business
method patents).
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arguments indicating that the incentive is largely unnecessary and,
consequently, the costs will likely substantially exceed value of what
little incremental innovation may be produced."'
Although the "public goods" problem associated with intellectual
products applies to both industrial and competitive arts innovation, it
operates very differently in each context. In the industrial arts, it causes
redirection of resources to goods or services less amenable to replica-
tion by observation.'56 These include goods, services and processes
which can be protected through self-help or under trade secret law. Ad-
ditionally, investment will be drawn to innovations which have built-in
barriers to entry or, at a minimum, offer significant lead-time advan-
tages, even if observed. These include inventions which rely on scarce
resources, such as personal talents, or require resource and time inten-
sive ramp-ups, such as building factories, implementing complex
fulfillment infra-structures or developing special expertise. As a conse-
quence, investment in innovation is driven by the efficacy of protecting
the related competitive advantage rather than the invisible allocative
hand of the competitive market. Patent law seems a reasonable way to
address these distortions.1
57
In the competitive arts, the ability to redirect investment is substan-
tially more limited. Some of the same distortions found in the industrial
arts will be present, with competitors pursuing those opportunities
which offer the greatest degree of confidentiality and the highest barri-
ers to replication. However, the very nature of marketing and selling
activity means most competitive arts innovations must be made visible
to the consumers and, ultimately, to competitors.'55 Additionally, fewer
marketing and sales techniques depend on complex enablers'59 and will,
therefore, be relatively easy to duplicate once observed. Consequently,
155. See Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 274-76; Raskind, supra note 5, at 77-78, 92-93.
156. See Chiappetta, Myth, supra note 11, at 136-38 (discussing the related preemption
argument).
157. The system, however, is not without critics. See supra note 11.
158. Although some innovations will apply to "back room" and internal processes,
most sales and marketing techniques must be shown to potential customers in the market to
be effective. Cf Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 14, at 2511-18 (discussing
"innovation bearing know-how on its face").
159. To the extent they do, the investment is in developing the enabler not the method
itself. Provided the patent law requirements are satisfied, a patent will issue on the enabler,
protecting the investment. See supra note 30 (explaining that the fact that an innovation is
used to "do business" should not affect its patentability). Although the enabler patent may
give defacto control over the method, it should not be confused with a right to a patent on
the method itself. A proper enabler patent does not prohibit others from using the method
itself, thus permitting others to work around the patent constraint and find improved imple-
mentations. See supra notes 28-30 (discussing the need to separate computing innovation
from competitive arts innovation).
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the majority of competitive arts innovations will be readily amenable to
lower-cost emulation, making investment in such innovations self-
defeating. Rather than redirection of resources, the primary consequence
of the "public goods" problem in the competitive arts should be stasis,
with every competitor ,eventually becoming frozen into a fixed set of
undifferentiated and unchanging sales and marketing activities.
Although patent law would again seem to provide the solution, the
value of a pro-patenting hypothesis is brought into question by the an-
ecdotal evidence concerning actual market conditions. Unlike the
industrial arts, which have been subject to patent protection throughout
the history of the United States, the competitive arts are recent newcom-
ers to the regime. 6 ' One would expect, therefore, that the absence of the
patent incentive would have generated substantial indications of the ex-
pected stasis. This does not, however, seem to be the case. Market
participants continue to generate a constant stream of sales and market-
ing innovation, 6' including the development of Internet commerce
itself. '6 Consequently, before incurring the costs of the patent incentive,
the reasons for this apparent anomaly should be explored.
A likely explanation is that, the theoretical market failure arguments
notwithstanding, in practice the market actually continues to provide
strong incentives to competitive arts innovation.6 ' To the extent stasis
starts to set in, competitors on the lookout for even small opportunities
to obtain advantage may be motivated to act.'6 Insiders may believe that
others, set in their ways, will be unable or unwilling to respond effec-
tively to innovation. Similarly, outsiders may seek to steal the march on
the complacent incumbents.
160. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text (noting that until State Street Bank
it was generally assumed business methods, including the competitive arts, could not be
patented).
161. See Lerner, supra note 112 (noting the frequency of innovation in the financial
products market); Raskind, supra note 5, at 92-93. Although it may be anecdotally observed
that competitors tend to use very similar sales and marketing techniques, that says nothing
about the rate of innovation. So long as the sales and marketing techniques continue to
change, as appears to be the case, "sameness" is not equivalent to stasis. Rather the similar-
ity among competitors merely confirms the normal pattern of rapid emulation in the
competitive arts. See Raskind, supra note 5, at 81.
162. There was no concern about Internet patents 10 years ago, because there was no e-
commerce.
163. See Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 275; Raskind, supra note 5, at 92-93.
164. The market drive to obtain competitive advantage, even temporarily, should not be
underestimated. Cf Raskind, supra note 5, at 85-86. Even with oligopoly and express mutu-
ally beneficial (if illegal) collusion the pressure to cheat is intense, leading to frequent self-
destruction of cartel activities. See AREEDA, supra note 90, at 167-68
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More generally, however, merely moving first provides competitive
advantage, even if others eventually adopt the new technique.'65 The key
lies in the time it takes competitors to identify, internalize and imple-
ment the innovation. During that period, the innovator, of course, gains
the incremental returns. More importantly, this built-in lead-time pro-
vides the opportunity to lock-in additional advantage further increasing
the return. 66 The lock-in may arise simply from first use. 67 Consumers
who develop a pattern of going to the innovator/first user will have in-
centives (familiarity, at a minimum) to maintain the existing
relationship rather than shift to a later emulative adopter. Additionally,
the market will normally strongly identify the innovator/first user with
the technique, pointing new consumers to the innovator rather than sub-
sequent implementors. Affirmative actions by the innovator can
enhance the lock-in effect. For example, advertising may expressly con-
dition the market to identify the innovator as the "best" source of the
technique. Follow-on incremental improvements, from additional in-
vestments or greater experience, may continue to extend the initial lead-
time advantage by providing consistently "new and improved" imple-
mentations.
Moreover, because the required research and development invest-
ment frequently will be low relative to the potential gain, even a modest
incentive can generate significant on-going innovation.' Industrial arts
innovation, even when spawned by a "eureka" insight, normally re-
quires substantial empirical follow-up investment to move from
abstraction to implementation. In contrast, competitive arts innovation
often only requires a substantially more modest investment. For exam-
ple, an affiliate referral process rests exclusively on the insight of
providing the customer with readily available information about, and
165. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MIcIH. TELECOM. & TECH. L. REv.
363 (2001), available at http://www.mttlr.org/volseven/lunney.html. The argument devel-
oped in the following text might logically be applied with equal force to product and service
innovation. The differences in development costs, discussed infra, may provide a partial
explanation for why patent coverage remains appropriate in products and services situations.
To the extent it does not, the arguments applicability raises doubts about the efficacy of the
patent system itself. See supra note 11 (noting that the proper operation of the patent system
is hardly a foregone conclusion). It certainly does not argue for extending an improperly
functioning system yet further to cover the competitive arts.
166. See Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 270-71, 275; Jared Earl Grusd, Internet Business
Methods: What Role Does and Should Patent Law Play?, 4 VA. J. L. & TECH. 9, T1 43-48
(1999); Lunney, supra note 165; Reichman, Charting, supra note 14, at 518; Reichman,
Legal Hybrids, supra note 14, at 2506-15 (noting the breakdown of this normal lead-time in
the Information Age).
167. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 270-71; Grusd, supra note 166, at 48.
168. Cf Raskind, supra note 5, at 81-82, 102 ("most business methods are developed
in the arena of competition, rather than in a laboratory environment").
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access to, the affiliate's goods or services. Implementation may only
involve a strategically positioned link on the original merchant's
webpage to the affiliate's e-commerce site. 69
The better hypothesis, therefore, appears to be that the increase in
innovation cannot justify the costs of applying the patent incentive to
the competitive arts.70 On the benefit side of the balance, although there
remains a possibility that the patent incentive might release a large pent
up wave of additional innovation, the chances appear remote.7 ' That
market failure stasis is holding back innovation seems extremely
unlikely. The competitive advantage in moving first not only gives in-
centive, but requires constant investment in innovation. On the other
side of the balance, substituting patent law's twenty-year, virtually ab-
solute, right to exclude all use in place of the market's far subtler first-
to-move lead-time advantage will generate substantial costs. The effect
would be to eliminate not only the reinstatement of competitive disci-
pline through relatively rapid emulative adoption, but also the loss of
broader access, the routine leap-frogging advances of adoption with mi-
nor differentiation that provide a constant cycle of small incremental
improvements, and additional applications of the new techniques.'72
These arguments combined with the concerns regarding objective
verification'73 and a strong bias in favor of non-interference with the
normal operation of the market absent a convincing demonstration of
169. In those instances where substantial investment in infrastructure innovation is re-
quired traditional patenting will independently provide the necessary incentive to investment
in the implementation technology. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
170. See Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 276-77; Raskind, supra note 5, at 102 (reaching the
same conclusion).
171. See Merges, supra note 5, at 582-83.
172. See Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 275-76; Raskind, supra note 5, at 81-82. Imagine,
for example, a world in which the inventor of credit sales was able to preclude its use by
others. See JOHN TAURANAC, THr EiPIRE STATE BUILDING 87 (1995) (attributing this inno-
vation to John J. Raskob of the General Motors Acceptance Corporation in 1919). On the
other hand, it could be argued that although the patent incentive might not produce substan-
tially more innovation than normal market forces, it accelerates the inventive process.
Although others might have to pay GMAC to use the credit sale competitive method (a trans-
fer of wealth), it would have been made beneficially available to the consuming public
earlier thus generating increased aggregate wealth (it was clearly at least a popular idea with
around 60% of all automobile sales being made on credit within eight years of its introduc-
tion by GMAC). Id. However, given the market's first-to-move lead-time drivers, it might be
reasonably assumed that competitors already have substantial motivation to act quickly in
the competitive arts and not much timing advantage would be generated. Moreover, any
advantage from earlier introduction might well be offset (or overwhelmed) by the patent
holder's refusal to license (generally or specifically) during the twenty year patent term thus
limiting public access to the innovation.
173. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
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the need to intervene,' 74 make the overall case for competitive arts pat-
enting appear extremely weak. Therefore, unless and until empirical
evidence demonstrates otherwise, the working hypothesis must be
against applying traditional patent law to the competitive arts.
II. SOMETHING SHORT OF BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS?
Based on the analysis in the preceding section, the answer to the
symposium's scope question appears straight-forward enough. If the
innovation lies in the computing implementation, traditional patent
scope limitations apply. If the innovation lies in the underlying
competitive arts, no patent should issue at all. Therefore, to the extent
such patents do issue, every available opportunity to limit their scope
should be aggressively pursued. Before dropping the inquiry, however,
we should further examine the forces behind the persistent drive for
protection.'75 Innovation in the competitive arts provides important
value, not only directly increasing efficiency in the delivery of goods
and services, but, more generally, optimizing the internal organization
and operation of businesses. Although patents, as we know them, may
be an inappropriate spur to advance in such activities, the relentlessness
of the advocates' desire to obtain protection may indicate some alterna-
tive accommodation is not only reasonable, but necessary.
The desire to escape the rent-eliminating disciplines of the market
provides one logical explanation. 76 Although understandable and ex-
tremely desirable from the individual competitor's standpoint, if the
174. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text. The possibility that the patent
system even when properly applied, may not be cost justified hardly inspires additional con-
fidence. See supra note 11.
175. The pursuit of business method patents is part of a general trend to extend the
scope of all forms of intellectual property protection, evident in recent legislative actions.
See, e.g, Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1994) (protecting
against tarnishment and blurring of trademarks without confusion); Anti-Cybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d) (1994) (protecting against use of trademarks
as domain names based on bad faith rather than confusion); The Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1202 (1999) (prohibiting circumvention of technological protections
for copyrighted material); the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. § 302
(1999) (extending the copyright term by 20 years); see also, Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 263-
64 (pointing out the trend). Whether this is a good thing is the subject of substantial debate.
See, e.g., Dennis Karjala, Opposing Copyright Extension, at http://vww.public.su.edu/
-dkarjala/; Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
YALE L. J. 1687 (1999). Some, but not all, of the following discussion has application to
these issues as well.
176. Certainly the experience when the examination requirement was eliminated dem-
onstrates the eagerness for this type of "competitive advantage." See Merges, supra note 5,
at 594-95.
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sole motivation is to lock-in competitive advantage to obtain supra-
competitive returns, we need look no further. Such protection of the
competitive arts stands in dramatic opposition to our fundamental belief
in the efficiency of the market's invisible hand and should be avoided.
7
The long and painful debate over the proper protection for computer
software7 reveals, however, that more is at stake. It was quickly recog-
nized that electronic duplication made investing in such innovations
especially problematic. 79 Not only could competitors avoid the innova-
tor's development costs, they could immediately recreate the entire
innovation with a few clicks of a mouse. There was no need to build
elaborate factories or train people in manufacturing processes; no need
for any substantial capital investment, ramp-up time or special skills. In
this new context, the "public goods" market failure appeared to threaten
destruction of the emerging industry.
Recently the computing industry's e-commerce offspring has
caused similar problems to arise in the competitive arts. The accelerat-
ing transition of the market from the physical world into the Internet
arena is undermining the market's traditional first-to-move lead-time
incentives to competitive means innovation."' A first-to-move lead-time
strategy made perfectly good sense in the original bricks and mortar
marketplace. Until competitors physically came to the store, or it was
raised by one of their customers, they had no way of knowing about the
new technique, much less recognize it as the source of competitive ad-
vantage. Even once they recognized the problem, time and resources
were required to investigate, identify the method's salient features (by
reverse engineering or otherwise), and develop and then execute a com-
peting implementation (including not just the technique, but the related
marketing efforts to overcome the innovator's first to market advan-
tages).' s' In this environment, the relatively modest investment required
for competitive arts innovation appeared a good risk.
8 2
177. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
178. See Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra note 8, at 106-20 (examining the
development of the case law); Kreiss, supra note 58, at 33 n.1 1 (citing a long list of articles
on the subject).
179. See Kariala, The Relative Roles, supra note 100, at 50-52; MERGES ET AL., supra
note 147, at 845.
180. See Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 14, at 2438-41, 2510-18 (Professor
Reichman's work focuses largely on technologies and the related possibility of trade secret
protection. His points apply equally, however, to the competitive arts).
181. See id.; Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 270-72 (discussing "lock in" effects).
182. See Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 270-72. In fact, pre-computing, natural lead-time
seemed such a powerful argument that some commentators questioned whether even tradi-
tional intellectual property protection was required. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy
Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs,
84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
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Advancing communications technologies consistently ate away at
this incentive. Air-mail, telephone and television offered fertile fields
for new marketing and sales techniques. However, they also made it
progressively easier for competitors to recognize, identify and imple-
ment those innovations. Market intelligence evolved away from
expensive and time-consuming reconnaissance trips and direct inquiries
of consumers. Instead, a competitor's marketing and sales innovations
increasingly could be brought directly to you, requiring only a subscrip-
tion to a catalog, reading print media advertising and, eventually, just
watching television.
The Internet has taken this assault on first-to-move lead-time a sig-
nificant additional step. In this environment, the only lag in recognizing
changes in a competitor's activities is the time it takes to locate the
competitor's webpage. More importantly, because the implementation
occurs in the computing context, quick and cheap electronic copying
dramatically reduces replication time and costs. A direct cut and paste
of the innovator's code offers an extremely rapid and efficient catch-up
strategy.1 83 Better understanding and enhancement can come later, using
reverse-engineering and re-programming as required.
E-commerce, therefore, dramatically alters the first-to-move lead-
time incentive calculation.1 4 The shortened time for identification and
replication eliminates virtually all short-term returns on the investment
and severely undermines the ability to generate any lock-in effects. Dif-
ferences among competitors' market positions make these effects even
more problematic. For example, such quick follow-on adoption by com-
petitors with greater name recognition or large, established customer
bases may not only destroy the innovator's lead-time advantage, but,
through a reverse "lock-in," transfer that advantage to themselves.'
Thus, innovation by new entrants or smaller, less-well known competi-
tors, precisely those which normally have the greatest incentive to
innovate, may accelerate their own destruction. Similarly, the risk of
immediate appropriation of competitive advantage by others will make
it extremely difficult for such new entrants and less financially robust
183. Arguing for copyright protection in the expression. See infra note 197 and accom-
panying text. But such protection provides no right to prevent use of the underlying method.
See supra notes 100-107 and accompanying text.
184. But see, Grusd, supra note 166, at 48 (noting anecdotal evidence that being first
to market may be a significant advantage on the Internet). It is different, however, to befirst
in a market and the first to implement a particular means of competition.
185. This effect would be very similar to the problems faced by a smaller, senior
trademark holder in "reverse confusion" cases. See. e.g., Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. The
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, 561 F.2d 1365 (10 Cir. 1977).
Defining the Proper Scope of Internet Patents
competitors to raise the investment capital necessary to launch or build
their businesses.
The adverse effects on traditional market incentives provide an al-
ternative, and likely, explanation for the increased interest in intellectual
property protection for business methods. Although some energy has no
doubt been redirected toward competitive arts innovations which can be
better protected (legally or practically) from copying,'8 other alterna-
tives are being sought to protect investment in the vast range of other
highly advantageous innovations which historically relied on first-to-
move lead-time strategies.'88 The virtually absolute exclusionary rights
under patent law offer a particularly attractive solution, generating the
widely recognized boom in business related applications, software and
otherwise.
This shift in the market's basic ground rules caused by quick and
cheap electronic copying justifies another look at intellectual property
law incentives.' 9 In the software market, after some exploration of third
paradigms,' the problem has been quite properly resolved (or at least is
in the process of being resolved) by appropriate application of patent
and copyright law. The CAFC's decisions in Alappat,9' State Street
Bank"'92 and AT&T' 93 have finally provided the necessary patent law
186. See Lemley, supra note 11, at 143-44 (noting the important role of patents in
venture capital financing).
187. Cf Raskind, supra note 5, at 93-95 (noting the presence of other remedies);
Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 14, at 2436-39 (noting the important role of trade
secret law in protecting unpatentable and uncopyrightable inventions).
188. See Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 14, at 2442-45.
189. The primary focus is on patent and copyright law. Trademark law although pro-
viding a means for locking-in differentiation, does not prevent adoption of the method itself.
See, Grusd, supra note 166, at 144-47. Trade secret law poses the insurmountable diffi-
culty of satisfying the secrecy requirement. See Chiappetta, Myth, supra note 11, at 77.
Professor Reichman argues for "portable secrecy" to overcome this problem. See Reichman,
Charting, supra note 14, at 519 (eliminating the "often socially irrelevant condition of actual
secrecy"). The policy objectives of trade secret law, which are dependant on "secrecy"
(properly defined), have nothing to do, however, with lead-time advantage and very little to
do with incentives to innovation. See Chiappetta, Myth, supra note 11, at 149-50. Therefore,
although Professor Reichman's proposed solution points in the right direction, the emphasis
and continued connection to trade secret law is misplaced. The new regime should be ar-
ticulated as what it is, a solution to the effects of quick and cheap copying on the market's
natural lead-time incentives, not as a necessary modification of the trade secret law regime.
190. This was the basic thrust of the Manifesto, see supra note 14, which argued that
neither patent or copyright law were appropriate and, therefore a new sui generis form of
protection was required. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 147, at 1028-36.
191. hz re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994)(en banc).
192. State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
193. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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complement to copyright protection.'94 With that protection now avail-
able, Professor Karjala's distinction between functional innovations and
works which "inform, entertain or portray an appearance to human be-
ings,"'95 can direct the proper application of the two regimes.'96
Copyright law (easy to obtain, jealous of derivative works, but unhelp-
ful regarding incorporated ideas and suspicious of intrusions on free-
speech and transformative use) protects any original expression,
whether found in specific coding, interfaces or otherwise, from quick
and cheap replication. Patent law (much more circumspectly granted,
but far more protective of the novel and non-obvious ideas it does
cover) protects the investment in any incorporated computing innova-
tions, whether presented as hardware, software or "as such" (provided
they are limited to a computing application), against all use, whether
copied, reverse engineered or independently created.
Unfortunately, this same approach does not provide a satisfactory
solution to the very different effects of quick and cheap copying in the
competitive arts first-to-move lead-time context. The copyright prong of
the solution continues to fit comfortably. As with software implementa-
tions, protecting the investment in specific original expression of the
process against quick and cheap "cut and paste" copying provides ade-
quate supplemental incentive while raising little risk of substantial
costs. 197 Later adopters are only prohibited from direct copying. They,
therefore, remain free to pursue independent creation or alternative ex-
pressive implementations of the underlying technique.
The problem lies in using patent law to provide the complementary
protection of the underlying methodology. The twenty-year patent ex-
clusion provides an excessive response. On the incentive side, much less
powerful rights would provide sufficient encouragement for the more
limited investment required to generate competitive arts innovation.
Before the current difficulties first-to-move lead-time managed to pro-
vide strong incentives through only a modest advantage.9" Even in
normal operation, it carries a significant element of risk. A competitor
might make an early identification, might quickly recognize its impor-
194. As Professor Karjala has noted, this solution first required that patent law backup
the denial of protection for methodology under copyright law. See Karjala, The Relative
Roles, supra note 100, at 56; see also, supra notes 21-24 (discussing the appropriateness of
patenting computer software as such).
195. Karjala, The Relative Roles, supra note 100, at 46.
196. See id. at 44-50 (explaining the different policies supporting each regime dictate
their application to different aspects (functional and expressive) of computer software, as
described below in the text).
197. Cf Stem, supra note 5, at 112-16 (noting the courts are drawing precisely this
line).
198. See supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
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tance, and might have the resources to implement rapidly. Or, the same
forces driving the innovator might lead competitors independently to
develop similar solutions virtually simultaneously.' 9 Moreover, even if
greatly reduced in the electronic environment, the market still provides
some incentive to competitive arts innovation. Despite the availability
of tools permitting quick and cheap replication, competitors may fail to
make full or effective use of them. And even if "Internet time" offers
only shortened time lags in competitive implementation, those delays
still exist and offer some possibility of associated competitive advantage
of innovator/first user lock-in.
The cost side is even less reassuring. As discussed abovem patent
law's exclusive long-term control substantially interferes with the com-
petitive discipline, broad access, and incremental innovation which
characterizes the operation of normal first-to-move lead-time incentives.
Additionally, objective verification concerns leave serious questions as
to whether patent protection drives actual innovation. Granting patents
in such circumstances may have the effect of permitting first comers to
an idea to block or collect rents" from those willing and able to make
the necessary refinements to make it work. These costs, combined with
the excessive nature of the incentive, make the patent prong of the soft-
ware solution seem unpromising at best and, more likely, dangerously
unjustified.
The existing regimes appear unable to provide appropriate relief. To
assume that means no solution is possible, however, reflects too limited
a view of the available alternatives. The existing intellectual property
paradigms are not cast in stone. Copyright law provides substantial evi-
dence of previous adjustments made in response to new market forces.
Section 10602 expressly contemplates incursions into the copyright
holder's rights, subjecting them to a long (and constantly evolving) list
of exceptions."3 These exceptions range from complete defenses, such
as fair use,2- to extremely specific and detailed adjustments applicable
to particular situations, such as educational use or operation of the
music industry.0 6 Not even patent law has been consistently applied in
199. Similar to the "ripeness of time" argument used against finding patent preemption
of trade secret law. See Chiappetta, Myth, supra note 11, at 143.
200. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
201. Cf Raskind, supra note 5, at 82 (noting the possibility of innovators becoming
merely licensing and litigation entrepreneurs).
202. 15 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
203. The current exceptions are found in 15 U.S.C. §§ 107-120 (1994).
204. 15 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
205. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 110(1)-(2) (1994); Thomas, supra note 2, at 47-50
(discussing the exception).
206. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 114-116 (1994).
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its traditional "all or nothing" formulation. The regime has been cau-
tiously modified on a number of occasions when it appeared necessary
to achieve an appropriate balance. For example, adjustments were made
to permit competitive application of medical procedures in patient
care2' and the patentee's exclusive rights were cut back to permit pre-
expiration use to obtain Federal Food and Drug Administration approval
for recombinant-DNA pharmaceuticals. 3
The possibility of specific modifications has not been lost on those
addressing the competitive arts problem. In response to State Street
Bank, Congress quickly amended the patent statute to include a "first
user" defense, mitigating the effect of business method patents on prior
implementors of a competitive arts technique.' The commentators have
gone even further. One particularly interesting approach suggests incor-
porating the copyright "scenes a faire" doctrine into business method
patenting.1 Such a modification would prevent patenting "when those
wishing to engage in the affected business cannot, as a practical matter,
engage in the business without infringing the patent.
' 21
Unfortunately, on closer analysis the "modest proposal" of making
adjustments to either patent or copyright law faces serious difficulties.
In the past the modifications to the existing regimes have primarily in-
volved specific adjustments to the standard holder rights. The
competitive arts lead-time market failure, however, requires a funda-
mentally different solution than the basic approach of either regime.
Protecting the functional methodologies forming the core of competitive
arts innovation requires a substantial adjustment to copyright law's
"original expression" focus. 1 2 Similarly, reducing the too powerful in-
centives under current patent law requires a significant redesign of the
rights granted . 3 Changing either regime will require more than limited
tinkering.
207. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1994); Thomas, supra note 2, at 47-50.
208. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(3) (1994).
209. See 35 U.S.C. § 273 (1999); James R. Barney, The Prior User Defense: A Re-
prieve for Trade Secret Owners or a Disaster for the Patent Law, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'Y 261 (2000) (discussing the adoption and possible effects of the defense).
210. See Stem, supra note 5, at 132-53.
211. Id. at 150. In many cases the doctrine would effectively prevent patenting com-
petitive arts methods, but that is precisely the intent. See id. at 153.
212. Competitive arts innovation is functional in nature and, therefore, granting copy-
right protection would conflict with the deliberate channeling of methodologies and
processes to patent law to avoid copyright law's more permissive approach to granting pro-
tection. See supra note 100-07 and accompanying text.
213. As opposed to merely limiting or eliminating their enforcement. See supra notes
207-08 and accompanying text. This over-incentive problem with standard patent rights has
been observed in other contexts, notably regarding the bio-technology industry, generating
similar efforts to make appropriate adjustments. See, e.g., Rebecca Eisenberg, Patents and
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The major concern, however, does not lie in having to make the
necessary adjustments, which will be required in any event. The more
serious problem is ensuring proper integration of dramatically different
protection into the existing regime. The new form of protection must be
clearly and completely disentangled from all inapplicable rights and
obligations of the original regime. Similarly, the myriad competitive
arts refinements must avoid unanticipated and undesirable effects on the
regular application of the existing regime.214 Ensuring that all of these
issues are properly identified and fully resolved is an extremely difficult
and complex task. Consequently, there is a significant risk that the
modification process will produce both an ineffective solution to the
competitive arts problem and substantial damage to the host regime.
IT[. A NEW "COMPETITIVE ARTS" REGIME
Fortunately there is a less risky approach: creating an independent
regime expressly tailored to resolving the special competitive arts inno-
vation problem.25 Designing an entirely new intellectual property
the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017
(1989) (arguing for an expanded application of experimental use); Maureen A. O'Rourke,
100 COLUM. L. REv. 1177, 1236-38 (2000) (proposing an analog to the fair use exception in
bio-technology patenting).
214. See, e.g., Barney, supra note 209, at 273 (noting the possible unintended problems
arising from the prior user defense).
215. The sui generis proposal of the Manifesto has, finally, come of age. See supra
note 190. However, the struggle over software patenting has finally revealed that the real
problem did not lie in software "as such." Rather, it was the use of software as a vehicle for
smuggling a wide variety of non-computing process claims (including those in the competi-
tive arts) into the patent regime without independent review. See supra notes 28-30 and
accompanying text. As Professor Reichman has pointed out, the key inquiry is actually
whether quick and cheap copying has led to a collapse of the traditional compartmentaliza-
tion presupposed by the "bipolar model" of patent and copyright law. See Reichman, Legal
Hybrids, supra note 14, at 2500-04; Reichman, Charting, supra note 14, at 478-79. When it
does, then the software patent/copyright solution (supra notes 190-201) will likely over-
protect, and an alternative must be found. Professor Reichman suggests that the resulting
proliferation of sui generis regimes, each attacking a specific aspect of the same problem,
should perhaps be replaced by a more unitary regime which directly addresses the common
root cause. Specifically, his proposal follows the lead of a variety of existing laws which
eschew exclusivity in favor of providing artificial legal lead-time substitutes through liability
rules "prefabricated licensing provisions." Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 14, at
2443-47, 2472-78 (noting in particular the Italian approach to protection of engineering
projects). Although the regime proposed in this Section continues to rely on patent law quali-
fication techniques to maintain the proper "front-end" balance between incentives and costs,
the remedial approach can be properly viewed as just such a set of prefabricated licensing
provisions tailored to the particular needs of the competitive arts. I am not convinced that all
of the examples raised by Professor Reichman actually require a sui generis solution or that
the problem, at least in the competitive arts context, stems from the inadequacy of trade
secret law to perform its historical function. Regarding the former, more study is required to
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regime is an enormous undertaking well beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. The following discussion, however, offers sufficient directional
observations regarding the basic structure to permit critical assessment
of the workability of the proposed solution.
The logical starting point is to identify the policy drivers: if we
don't know where we want to go, we are unlikely to get there."6 The key
concern is the potential under-production of desirable competitive arts
innovations. By definition, the competitive arts operate and have value
exclusively in the marketplace. Therefore, the same market economics
approach guiding patent law provides an appropriate framework for ar-
ticulating the objectives of the new regime.1 7 Stating the regime's goal
in these terms is relatively straight-forward: it seeks to provide incen-
tives countering the adverse effects on the market's first-to-move lead-
time driver of competitive arts innovation caused by quick and cheap
copying, at levels which make it likely that the benefits of supplemental
creation outweigh the social cost of lost access by potential users, in-
cluding competitors, consumers and improvers. The complexity, as
always, lies in the details.
As discussed above, traditional copyright law properly and ade-
quately addresses protecting the original expression of competitive arts
innovations.28 The problem (and the new regime's focus) lies in adjust-
ing patent law's overly strong complementary protection for the
functionality. A variety of analogs to the patent system's approach are,
therefore, an appropriate starting point. First, the regime's incentive,
like patent law, should target only actual innovation. Subsequent, inde-
pendent duplicative invention adds nothing new to the body of
competitive arts techniques. Motivating discovery and emulative im-
plementation of techniques already developed by others is best left to
normal market forces. The copyright threshold of mere originality is,
determine whether such a regime has broad application or whether a variety of specially
tailored regimes will be required. Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 14, at 2447-48
(Professor Reichman himself states that his proposal may be more appropriately viewed as a
way of thinking about the problem raised by quick and cheap copying). Regarding the latter,
to view the solution as replacing trade secret law (which never applied to any appreciable
extent to the competitive arts) rather than shoring up market driven first-to-move lead-time
incentives, risks damage to the trade secret law regime (adding further confusion to its policy
justifications) and requires substantial efforts to disentangle the new regime from its re-
quirements (including its inapplicable focus on secrecy). See supra note 189.
216. Proposing a new form of protection also may raise Constitutional and treaty obli-
gation questions. See infra note 292-96 and accompanying text.
217. It could, of course, be argued that the assumed "given" of using a market economy
approach is inappropriate. If so, then the entire goal structure changes and so must the analy-
sis. See supra note 88.
218. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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therefore, too low 9 and must cede to the more demanding patent law
requirements of novelty/non-obviousness (invention) and util-
ity/description/enablement (providing objective means to ensure
presence of benefits)."" Second, although personal return may provide
the mechanism, the incentive is provided to increase competitive effi-
ciency and maximize aggregate social wealth, not reward the
innovator.2' This focus confirms the need for description/enablement as
well as publication and calls for limiting the term of protection, in order
that the public might benefit from its investment. Finally, the need to
limit disruptive and inefficient over-reaching and in terrorem assertions
supports some form of prior examination to ensure that these require-
ments are met.m
Adopting the basic patent model for obtaining protection carries
over the concerns bedeviling current business method patenting into the
new regime. As Professor Merges has quite properly pointed out, for
any regime to operate effectively, improper issuances must be
minimized.22 This can be accomplished in part by improvements in the
examination process, such as ensuring that examiners have the requisite
training and expertise, and maximizing identification of relevant prior
art. The training and expertise requirements can be satisfied by hiring
competitive arts examiners with educational and professional
backgrounds in the competitive arts; marketing, sales and finance, in
particular. 2 4 As commentators have noted, the relevant prior art will be
both more current and far more ancient than existing patent records will
reveal.m Additionally, by its nature, much of the prior art will not be
documented in the manner of traditional industrial and scientific
219. See, e.g., MERGES ET AL., supra note 147, at 329-32 (noting that originality means
to the author, not novelty in the absolute sense).
220. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103, 112 (1994); Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra note
8, at 100-05 (discussing the requirements).
221. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 137, 176 (discussing the problems encountered when the patent
examination requirement was dropped). The examination requirement is also supported by
the in terrorem effects of unjustified litigation as a means for impeding competitors. See
Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 270; Merges, supra note 5, at 600; Raskind, supra note 5, at 82.
223. See Merges, supra note 5, at 588. Professor Merges correctly notes that the mini-
mization process itself requires a cost-benefit balancing exercise. Id. at 592-93.
224. The USPTO Business Method Patent Initiative moves in this direction. See
Maulsby, supra note 2, at 9 (setting out the Initiative's call for enhanced training and avail-
ability of business specialists to act as a resource for the examiners). To implement the new
regime, however, actual business professionals will be required, meaning a change should be
made in the traditional technical background prerequisite for taking the Patent Bar. See
Grusd, supra note 166, at 71; John Kasdan, Obviousness and New Technologies, 10
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 159, 180-81 (1999) (discussing the problem).
225. See Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 270; Merges, supra note 5, at 589-90; see also,
Lemer, supra note 2, at 2; Thomas, supra note 2, at 31-32.
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research. Its identification will, therefore, require inquiry into actual
activities in the market itself. These special characteristics will
necessitate development of new databases and new search techniques
(such as on-line inquiry by examiners).,26
They also make exploring more significant departures from tradi-
tional patent examination appropriate. Serious consideration should be
given to increasing the applicant's participation in the identification
process. 7 The focus should shift from punishing an applicant's inten-
tional misconduct (inequitable conduct)21 to affirmatively bringing the
applicant's business expertise and resources to bear.29 Requiring more
active involvement in the prior art collection process not only improves
review of the specific application, but helps build and update the neces-
sary prior art database. Significant value could be added, without
significant cost or risk to the applicant,"0 by requiring a modest, well-
defined, pre-filing search designed to capture the most accessible in-
formation. For example, an appropriate search might be limited to
inquiring of those formally associated with the inventor (employees and
contractors within the same group of affiliated business organizations)
and a review of the applicant's own internal records at the time of appli-
cation. Additionally, intent to deceive should be abandoned in favor of a
disclosure standard requiring the applicant to produce any information a
reasonable examiner making a novelty or non-obviousness decision
would deem material. Failure to provide such information, either actu-
ally known or which "should have been known" based on the required
search, would render the related claims invalid.23'
226. As there would be pre-issuance publication (see infra notes 232-34 and accompa-
nying text) an examiner could even send out a general request for prior art. See, e.g. LawCast
Roundtable, supra note 112 (noting use of a similar technique to support a validity challenge
in a lawsuit); Maulsby, supra note 2, at 9 (Business Method Patent Initiative calls for ex-
tended non-patent literature searches).
227. Although an applicant must come forward with material information of which it is
aware, see 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1999), under current patent law there is no affirmative obliga-
tion to perform a search. See, e.g., American Hoist & Derrick Company v. Sowa & Sons,
Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
228. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 147, at 271-77.
229. Cf Merges, supra note 5, at 601 (noting that private parties will hold much of the
relevant information, leading him to recommend a patent opposition system). This same
consideration would also lend support for involving the applicant directly in the prior art
identification system.
230. Cf id. at 600 (noting the desirability of avoiding excessive costs on the applicant,
particularly small inventors).
23 1. As the commentators have noted, one consequence of eliminating the intent to de-
ceive standard (and increasing the applicant's duty to search) will be to create a flood of
document submissions. See, e.g., LawCast Report, supra note 112 (the comments of Profes-
sor Thomas). Particularly if Rule 56 continues in its present form, making the lawyer
potentially liable as well, the standard advice will be to submit everything in hand. Cf. id.
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The quest for comprehensive "up front" prior art identification also
argues strongly in favor of incorporating a pre-issuance publication and
a post-issuance opposition procedure. Publication and solicitation of
submissions from those in the potentially affected markets substantially
expands the scope of prior art considered, while making the rights
which do issue more reliable and, therefore, more valuable to the
holder 3 Additionally, these gains can be obtained without the substan-
tial traditional patent law concern over pre-issuance secrecy. In most
competitive arts cases publication does not force the innovator to forgo
a long-term trade secret alternative, as the method will become visible
immediately on use. Although some conflicts do remain, these can be
largely mitigated by withholding publication until late in the review
process and by ensuring that the rights granted preserve the potentially
important first to market advantage.2 A post-issuance opposition pro-
cedure avoids undue delay in obtaining rights (including dilatory tactics
by well-financed competitors) while providing a number of benefits. 5
(comments of PTO Commissioner Q. Todd Dickenson). One answer, of course, is that this is
the price of reducing costs otherwise borne by competitors in the marketplace by ensuring
only appropriate patents issue. Cf Merges, supra note 5, at 596. Additionally, the process of
collecting available competitive arts prior art benefits the system overall. However, simply
placing the entire cost of handling voluminous submissions on the USPTO ignores some
relatively simple adjustments. The applicant could be required to explain why a reference
has been submitted and its view of the effect. Extreme cases of over-submission could be
subject to some form of financial penalty to both offset the costs and provide deterrence.
Finally, holding the attorney responsible only in intentional or grossly negligent cases, and
using a reasonableness standard to measure applicant compliance, would mitigate the risks
and related conservatism of professional advice. See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
232. See Merges, supra note 5, at 610-15; Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Build-
ing, and the Usefid Arts, 74 IN'D. L.J. 759, 776-85 (1999). These arguments, among others
(including pressure to conform United States law to that in many other jurisdictions), have
led to the adoption of a pre-issuance publication requirement for all utility patent applica-
tions which are also filed overseas (35 U.S.C. § 122(b)) as well as the introduction of similar
proposed legislation regarding all competitive arts patents. See Business Method Patent Im-
provement Act of 2000, H.R. 5364, 106th Cong. (2000) (introduced by Representatives
Boucher and Berman proposing, among other things, a pre-grant publication requirement
and a post-grant opposition procedure) [hereinafter Boucher Proposal].
233. See Merges, supra note 5, at 615; Nard, supra note 232, at 759.
234. This may require some form of pre-issuance, post-publication provisional rights
similar to those found in 35 U.S.C. § 154(d) (addressing a similar problem regarding man-
dated pre-issuance publication under the Patent Act); see also infra notes 263-64 and 271-
72 and accompanying text (discussing the first to market right).
235. Professor Merges notes that although current patent law provides for third party
reexamination, the evidence indicates it has not proven a useful tool. Professor Merges ar-
gues that a true opposition procedure "better taps into patent validity information, much of
which is in private hands," than reexamination, and notes that until the procedure is imple-
mented "the quality of patents will not improve." Id. at 614-15; see also John. R. Allison &
Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q. J.
185 (1998) (noting that most invalidated patents involve prior art not considered at examina-
tion); Nard, supra note 232, at 764-65.
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The administrative opposition review is cheaper than litigation for all
involvedrs and reduces the in-terrorem and wasteful effects of invalid
assertions via litigation2 7
These special concerns should also be expressly reflected in the na-
ture of the examiner's review. A detailed and complete record should be
developed during prosecution. It should precisely indicate what has
been invented (carefully defining terms and identifying the specific
novelty supporting the claims) and document what output it produces,
how it does so and how we know. The record should also clearly explain
how the particular innovation relates to, and has been distinguished
from, the prior art. If prior art is found irrelevant, the record should say
so. If amendments are required, the record should explain their objective
and scope. Such a record will help guide subsequent judicial interpreta-
tion. It reduces ambiguity in terminology and confusion over the scope,
novelty and purpose of the invention. It also provides a predicable and
justifiable basis for invoking Warner-Jenkinson"S prosecution history
estoppel and its limiting effect on the doctrine of equivalents (especially
important in a post-Festo world). 9 To ensure adequate time and energy
is applied to the examination process, examiner review criteria and
compensation should explicitly incorporate considerations relating to
the quality of the examination records produced.24
The final "procedural" adjustment related to these prior art concerns
involves a change to the presumption of validity normally accorded a
granted patent. 4' All evidence should be considered de novo by the fact-
finder under a preponderance of the evidence burden imposed on the
defendant to demonstrate invalidity. 42 The existing doctrine that when
previously unconsidered prior art is raised in litigation no special defer-
ence is owed to PTO review, would continue to apply.43 Regarding
previously considered art, however, there would be no specific instruc-
236. Cf. Merges, supra note 5, at 610 (making the argument regarding examinations).
237. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
238. See Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
239. See MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 918-
34 (1998) (discussing Warner-Jenkinson, the presumption and its effect on the doctrine of
equivalents). A focused prosecution discussion regarding amendments also provides greater
confidence regarding the reasonableness of the broader inapplicability of the doctrine of
equivalents called for in Festo. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
240. See Merges, supra note 5, at 606-09.
241. See 35 U.S.C. §282 (1994) ("A patent shall be presumed valid.").
242. See, e.g., Boucher Proposal, supra note 232; James Pooley, The Trouble with Pat-
ents: What's Wrong with the Current System and How to Fix It, CAL. LAW. October 2000, at
42, 81-82.
243. See, e.g., American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350,
1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
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tion that special evidentiary weight should be accorded to the issuance
of the patent. However, nothing would preclude the finder of fact from
giving facts whatever it considered appropriate weight (including taking
into account the examiner's expertise) in making its determination.
Consequently, the presumption of validity would be limited to whatever
special weight the fact-finder wished to accord issuance or examiner
expertise under the specific circumstances and to tipping the balance in




In addition to these procedural modifications, the application of the
substantive patent law "innovation" standards requires some refinement
to reflect the new context. In every review, a clear separation between a
computing implementation and the underlying competitive arts process
must be carefully maintained. The former adds nothing to the latter and
vice-versa.245 Substantively, the § 102 and related judicial articulation of
novelty (as it may need to continue to evolve to reflect global and tech-
nological considerations246) properly reflect the similar "progress"
(versus copyright "originality") objectives of the proposed regime. Non-
obviousness, however, needs re-calibration to reflect the patterns of in-
novation in the competitive arts environment.247 Much competitive arts
innovation consists of a pattern of catch-up, "me too" adoptions of an
existing implementation with minor (but featured) adjustments to pro-
vide marketing differentiation.248 Such activity is primarily motivated by
a competitive need to keep current. It neither requires substantial in-
vestment nor adds much to the competitive arts. Moreover, many of
these substantively meaningless differentiating changes may actually
cause more harm than good.2 4 9 Intellectual property intervention, there-
fore, seems not only unnecessary but inappropriate. The typical
244. The result would not be as strong as a "rule of doubt" as the patentee would still
benefit from the "tie-breaking" effect of the presumption. Cf. John Kasdan, supra note 224,
at 182-84 (discussing the rule of doubt).
245. See supra note 28-30 and accompanying text.
246. For example, increased internationalization of intellectual property law may
eventually require further elimination of existing geographic limitations in United States
patent law. Cf., 35 U.S.C. § 104; MERGES ET AL., supra note 147, at 296 (discussing the
expansion of the inventorship inquiry). Similarly, the "printed publication" limitations in
§ 102 will become, if they are not already, increasingly problematic in the intangible elec-
tronic Internet environment. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and (b) (1994).
247. See Kasdan, supra note 224, at 163-79; Grusd, supra note 166, at 32-72 (both
discussing the need for a better tailored standard of non-obviousness for business method
patents).
248. See Raskind, supra note 5, at 65-67, 81-82.
249. To the extent it is based on differentiation without any actual benefit in terms of
efficiency. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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emulation and incremental "leap-frogging" can, and should, be left to
the marketplace.
In contrast, competitive art techniques which involve either entirely
new paradigms, or significant discontinuities from what has been done
previously ("pioneering innovations"), are more likely to produce actual
changes in efficient delivery of goods and services or business opera-
tions."0 More critically, investment in, and implementation of, such
techniques are much less likely to be motivated by merely keeping up,
requiring the ability to lock-in the advantage provided by traditional
first-to-move lead-time incentives. These innovations are precisely
those targeted by the new regime and deserve protection. Therefore,
although it might be argued that traditional notions of obviousness can
properly differentiate between unprotected incremental change and
paradigm shifting,"', the ambiguous nature of the exercise can, and
should, be substantially clarified in the case of the competitive arts. 
22
The new regime's non-obviousness test should crisply generate the
separation by explicitly raising the standard to cover only pioneering
change from the prior art. In many cases, this means it will not be suffi-
cient to demonstrate lack of suggestion, long felt need, or commercial
success. 3 The regime requires the clear demonstration of a paradigm
shift, not merely an accomplishment beyond the reach of one of ordi-
nary skill in the competitive arts.2
These increased requirements and standards will undermine the re-
gime's incentives to some extent. Supplemental investigation, dealing
250. The concept of pioneering innovations is not new to patent law. See, e.g., Boyden
Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 569 (1898); MERGES ET AL., supra note
147, at 250. In this respect the competitive arts may differ from the software industry. See
Cohen & Lemley, supra note 24, at 53 (noting the potentially harmful effects of protecting
only pioneering innovations).
251. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., No. Civ. A. 96-434-SLR, 1999
WL 1050064, *21-23 (D. Del. 1999) (having no trouble finding the invention obvious on
remand from the CAFC); Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 10 (noting the case).
252. See Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 267-69; Grusd, supra note 166, at para. 70;
Kasdan, supra note 224, at 174 (all noting that the current standard may be permitting issu-
ance of too many obvious patents).
253. These are common considerations in current non-obviousness determinations. See
MERGES ET AL., supra note 147, at 207-16.
254. The "gee wiz" factor which Professor Dreyfuss identifies as a problem in many
Internet patents can actually help direct the inquiry. Cf Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 270. Once
the confusion of the computing aspects of the implementation are eliminated, as they should
be, most competitive arts techniques will appear painfully straight-forward especially when
combined with an aggressive view of analogous art. See Margo A. Bagley, 7 MIcH. TELE-
COMm. & TECH. L. REv. 253 (2001) available at, http://www.mttlr.org/volseven/bagley.html.
Consequently, they will rarely provide the "paradigm shift" necessary to support non-
obviousness. Additionally, the more objective approach to obviousness proposed by Profes-
sor Lunney, specifically the focus on the amount of creative investment, may also help
distinguish the routine from the pioneering inventions. See Lunney, supra note 165.
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with detailed examination and fending off opposition challenges, take
time and money. The higher bar for non-obviousness will exclude a
substantial amount of competitive arts activity. The requirements that
the applicant "should have known" and must disclose any material in-
formation introduce enforcement uncertainty. Some of these effects can
be mitigated by circumspect judicial review, applying similar standards
already used in other areas of the law. For example, the disclosure bur-
den could be tied to the familiar "material to an investment decision"
standard in securities law. 5 Similarly, the search requirement and re-
lated "should have known" obligation can be tied to specific
requirements set using an economic reasonableness gloss similar to the
already well-elaborated limitation on "reasonable efforts" found in trade
secret law.26
More importantly, however, the regime's goal is to supplement the
first-to-move lead-time incentive of the marketplace, not provide a safe-
haven from competition. The particular costs and risks in the proposed
regime appropriately reflect concerns that less demanding qualification
standards may result in unmerited social costs attendant to over-
protection and unjustified limitations on access by other users.
Turning to rights and remedies under the proposed regime brings
the earlier discussed concerns with the patent model back into play. Al-
though the focus on functional innovation and potential over-reaching
justify application of its qualification framework, the long-term, quasi-
absolute right to exclude provides far too powerful and costly an incen-
tive.27 Responding to the adverse effects of quick and cheap copying on
traditional first-to-move lead-time market drivers requires only a much
subtler nudge to bring innovative activities back into proper align-
ment.23
Instead copyright law's more flexible approach of specially tailored
rights and remedies, eschewing "one size fits all" exclusions in favor of
expressly building in specific limitations reflecting competing policy
objectives, provides a far more appropriate framework. For example,
§ 115 of the Copyright Act29 was designed to address a similar tension
between incenting innovation while avoiding broad foreclosure of
255. This would parallel the previous version and interpretation of Rule 56. Cf ADEL-
MAN ET AL., supra note 239, at 735-37.
256. See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc., 925 F.2d 174
(7th Cir. 1991)(Himiting efforts to those economically reasonable under the circumstances);
see also, Chiappetta, Myth, supra note 11, at 125, 149 (describing the use of a similar
"reasonableness" test to define the search necessary to establish holder bonafides in a trade
secret leveraging transaction)
257. See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
258. See Reichman, Charting, supra note 14, at 516-20.
259. 17U.S.C. § 115 (1994).
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subsequent use. Under its provisions the author retains the timing and
recognition advantages inherent in being the first to market.26 However,
after such first use, the work must be licensed to third parties (including
competitors) for a reasonable (statutorily established) royalty. 6' The
resulting incentives and costs are, therefore, both substantially lower
than under the patent regime. The compulsory licensing requirement
eliminates the powerful motivation of long-term supra-competitive
returns potentially available under a pure 20-year right to exclude. On
the other hand, the lost social wealth is limited by permitting others to
use the technique whenever justified in light of the royalty obligation.
The same basic balance drawn under the "cover" concept matches
up well with the proposed competitive arts regime's objective of sup-
plementing the impaired first-to-move lead-time advantage, and
provides an appropriate remedial framework.:2 The innovator receives
the important right to control first introduction in the market. This right
not only preserves the first-to-move advantages associated with initial
entry as well as recognition as the source of the new technique, 63 but
guarantees that third parties informed of the technique through pre-
issuance publication2 4 cannot steal the march on the innovator. A com-
pulsory licensing requirement can substantially mitigate the quick and
cheap damage to lead-time advantage,"5 while preserving access by oth-
ers. As under normal market conditions, once an innovation has been
introduced, others are free to adopt the technique. Although the regime
permits competitive entry, it also imposes a royalty payable to the inno-
260. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a) requires that to trigger third party access the musical work first
must be "distributed to the public in the United States under the authority of the copyright
owner."
261. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(c) (1994).
262. The argument is not that the copyright provision be directly imported into the new
regime, just that the more nuanced methodology provides important guidance. A number of
significant changes in the specifics are required to match the competitive arts environment.
For example, § 115 prevents any use which impairs the "integrity" of the original work,
specifically prohibiting changes to the "basic melody or fundamental character of the work."
17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (1994). This reflects more concern for the author's personhood than is
appropriate to the competitive arts environment, and, therefore, should be omitted. The § 115
rights also limit access to those making new sound recordings, requiring a separate perform-
ance license which can be withheld. Again, this is inappropriate to the lead-time objectives
of the competitive arts regime which permits all use by the competitor against payment of
royalties. Additionally, the compensatory approach of § 115 is replaced by a cost-
differentiation objective more suitable to the competitive arts lead-time concern.
263. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 232-34 and accompanying text (arguing for pre-issuance publica-
tion to facilitate prior art identification).
265. The following analysis closely parallels the logic offered by Professor Reichman
in support of his "prefabricated licensing provisions" remedies. See supra note 215
(discussing the proposal); Reichman, Charting, supra note 14, at 518-20; Reichman, Legal
Hybrids, supra note 14, at 2444-48.
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vator. Unlike § 115, however, the objective is not to compensate the
inventor. The royalty, therefore, need not reflect market value or amor-
tize the inventor's development costs.2 6 Rather, because it exists
exclusively to provide the innovator a supplemental short-term advan-
tage over competitors, it only need provide a modest cost differential' 67
As with market lead-time, such a royalty provides a limited window of
competitive opportunity which closes as rivals identify and develop
cost-saving improvements. During this period, however, the innovator
can attempt to consolidate its advantage through lock-in techniques
similar to those employed under normal first-to-move lead-time condi-
tions.'6
Some additional refinements to this rights/remedial structure are re-
quired to obtain an appropriate benefit-cost balance. The first relates to
the term of protection. The new regime's objective is to supplement the
damaged market lead-time incentive. That incentive does not normally
endure for long periods, even under optimum market conditions. Cou-
pling this need for a relatively weak right with the desire to avoid the
costs of unnecessary exclusion points to a much shorter term of protec-
tion than copyright's life of the author plus seventy-years. 69 Although
empirical study is required, it is not unreasonable to hypothesize that a
period as short as one year, but certainly no longer than two or three,
after issuance should be more than sufficient.2 70
266. Unlike the § 115 "cover" approach, which seeks to provide a reasonable return on
the author's investment in the work and is informed by, among other things, voluntary mar-
ket rate agreements as a guide. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 115(c)(3)(E), 801(b)(1)(B). The proposed
regime thus avoids the common argument that compulsory licensing systems are unworkable
because they cannot produce proper valuations. Cf Lemley, supra note 101, at 1071
(indicating the preference for market driven solutions); Robert P. Merges, Are You Making
Fun of Me? Notes on Market Failure and the Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q. J.
305, 310 (1993) (noting the normal objective in compulsory licensing as "supply(ing) a mu-
tually beneficial exchange where the market will not").
267. The remedy in an infringement lawsuit should, however, take into account both
the costs to the rights holder and the need to deter infringers from not voluntarily coming
forward to obtain a license in the hope they will not be detected and thereby avoid the lead-
time cost advantage of the regime. See infra text following note 354; cf Chiappetta, Myth,
supra note 1l, at 156, 161.
268. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (describing the normal lock-in steps
which may be taken). In order to preserve initial advantage, particularly regarding larger,
well-financed competitors, it may also be necessary to delay competitive entry for a short
period following introduction by the innovator.
269. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1994). There are those that argue, convincingly, that the term of
copyright protection does not even match with the objectives of copyright law; but that is a
separate debate. See supra note 175 (referencing Professor Karala's extensive Website on
the subject).
270. The term could be tied to an empirical economic analysis of ramp-up times for
competitors under normal market conditions. An approach reflecting greater optimism in
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For similar reasons, the innovator's exclusive right to first imple-
mentation should also be time constrained. An inventor controls, and is
free to withhold or limit, use of any innovation which can be kept confi-
dential. The competitive arts innovations targeted by the new regime,
however, are those disclosed by use and, consequently, motivated by,
and depend on, the first-to-move lead-time incentive.2 ' Therefore, they
will generally provide maximum advantage through quick action. Al-
though market conditions or implementation requirements may affect
the precise timing of an introduction, there will normally be a relatively
short time period between innovation and market launch. Additionally,
society stands to gain from rapid introduction into the marketplace.
There is, therefore, little reason, nor much value, in permitting innova-
tors to delay introduction by sitting on their first to introduce rights for
extended periods of time.272 On the other hand, if the system is to en-
courage early filings, the problem presented by equally early publication
must also be taken into account. Consequently, the right to first intro-
duction should extend sufficiently beyond actual issuance to ensure a
reasonable period for pre-launch preparations. In all events, the failure
to exercise the first introduction right during the reserved window
should not effect the compulsory licensing portion of the regime which
would go into effect immediately upon expiration of that right.
Careful attention must also be paid to the effect of enforcement ac-
tions on competitors' investment in innovation. Despite the adoption of
a more flexible "copyright-like" approach to remedies, that regime's
empirical and economic methods might even seek to tie the term to that which yielded the
optimum generation of competitive arts innovation benefits for the costs incurred.
271. To the extent practical control through confidentiality is possible, innovators will
likely seek the more generous protection under trade secret law. It is precisely the recogni-
tion of this practical reality that justifies trade secret law. See generally, Chiappetta, Myth,
supra note 11. In contrast, the new regime targets only methods which cannot be practically
controlled, and therefore, cannot (and never could) benefit from trade secret protection. Con-
sequently, there is no overlap and no practical or policy conflict, between the two regimes.
272. Cf Martin J. Adelman, Property Rights Theory and Patent-Antitrust: The Role of
Compulsory Licensing, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 977, 1002 (1977) (arguing against the right of a
patentee to suppress a patent and the use of compulsory licensing); see also, infra notes 352-
54 and accompanying text (discussing the right under current patent law not to license or use
a patent during its term and it's inappropriateness in the competitive arts context). For simi-
lar reasons a first to file system may be more appropriate than the first to invent and statutory
bar approach under patent law. The change would reduce uncertainty and avoid substantial
administrative complexity. Although the approach does disadvantage innovators with fewer
available resources to apply to implementation, this group faces the same problem in a prop-
erly operating first-to-move lead-time market environment. Moreover, making a commercial
arts innovation ready for patenting will in many cases require relatively little time and capi-
tal. Consequently, a commercial arts innovator who failed to quickly file would likely face
substantial § 102(g) lack of diligence, suppression or concealment risks under the existing
system
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"substantial similarity" standard for determining infringement not only
covers a lot of ground, but its inherent ambiguity casts an extremely
broad shadow. 3 The need for a more limited incentive, and the con-
cerns regarding over-protection, dictate greater attention to the costs
generated by ambiguity and over-reaching under the competitive arts
regime. The reach of the holder's fights should, therefore, be defined
and limited consistent with the manner of their creation, by applying the
greater precision and predictability of claims-based infringement used
in patent law.274
If the objective is precision and predictability, improper or uncertain
application of patent law's doctrine of equivalents may still result in
over-protection within the context of the competitive arts regime.275 Re-
cent work by Professors Cohen and Lemley concerning software
patents276 provides a straight-forward approach for determining whether
a real problem exists. The appropriateness of the doctrine of equivalents
in a particular context lies in the answer to the following question:
"[w]hat is to be gained by making infringers out of... routine innova-
tors?,
277
Regarding competitive arts innovation, the answer is "not much, but
just enough to merit an expansive view of equivalents." In the
competitive arts regime, only paradigm shifting inventions receive
protection under the enhanced non-obviousness standard. Thus, the
doctrine of equivalents raises a stark conflict. A narrow reading of the
claims is inconsistent with the "pioneering" character of the invention
and, thus, threatens to undermine the incentive when it is most
appropriate.2 8 Conversely, an expansive reading makes investment in
incremental improvements extremely problematic. Such an innovator
will both infringe and be unable to obtain an improvement "blocking
patent" with which to negotiate.279 Consequently, broad protection under
273. See Karijala, The Relative Roles, supra note 100, at 44-45.
274. See id.; see also Lemley, supra note 101, at 1068-84 (arguing that patent law type
limitations generally provide better incentives to improvement innovations).
275. This concern has been brought to forefront of patenting discussions by the
CAFC's decision in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558
(Fed. Cir. 2000), which focused on the notice function of the claims as the justification for
significantly curtailing the reach of the doctrine of equivalents whenever an amendment
related to patentability occurred during prosecution. See supra notes 238-39 and accompa-
nying text (discussing prosecution history estoppel).
276. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 24.
277. Id.at51.
278. See supra notes 247-54 and accompanying text.
279. As Professors Cohen & Lemley point out, many improving innovators in the soft-
ware arena are partially protected against the consequences of infringement through their
blocking patents. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 24. In the competitive arts the significant
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equivalents threatens to inhibit the normal emulation-minor
differentiation incremental innovation which currently characterizes
most competitive arts activity.2"
Although intractable in the traditional exclusive rights context of
patent law, this conflict proves far less problematic in the competitive
arts regime. The rights holder has only the privilege of first introduction
and thereafter an entitlement to the short-term royalty due under the
compulsory licensing system. Even an infringing incremental innovator
has the absolute right to make any improvements provided that the roy-
alty is paid. Market incentives will, therefore, continue to drive any
improvements whose value at least offsets the royalty. Other improve-
ments only need await the expiration of the short-term of protection. A
broad application of the doctrine of equivalents, therefore, permits the
regime's incentive to emerge intact, while the limited nature of the
rights causes relatively little long-term disincentive to subsequent im-
provements.
Equivalents problems, therefore, are primarily limited to ensuring
that the original claims are appropriately drawn and interpreted in light
of the prior art. The fully documented prosecution history, coupled with
aggressive application of the Warner-Jenkinson presumption (as further
interpreted in Festo),28' and the modifications suggested by Professors
Cohen and Lemley to the "known interchangeability" and "reverse
equivalents" doctrines, can mitigate many of these concerns.82 Regard-
ing "known interchangeability," Cohen and Lemiey convincingly argue
that when there are problems with ensuring pre-issuance identification
of all relevant prior art (as is the case with the competitive arts), a
proper result can be reached under the doctrine of equivalents by de-
ciding if the subsequently cited prior art had been before the examiner,
that the "patent would have been narrowed in a way that would save the
accused improvement. ' '283 Their expanded view of reverse equivalents
similarly reflects the need to properly limit the original claims, but in
this instance to ensure that equally pioneering subsequent advances are
not inappropriately absorbed.2m In the competitive arts regime, their ap-
proach permits application of the same heightened standard of
obviousness to the equivalents question, directing the enforcing court to
barrier posed by the heightened standard of non-obviousness denies this potentially off-
setting right.
280. See supra notes 172 and 248.
281. See supra note 238-39 and accompanying text.
282. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 24, at 53-55.
283. Id. at 54.
284. Id. at 54-55.
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look out for and protect subsequent dramatic changes of direction and
discontinuities.
Although a patent infringement approach provides an appropriately
limited scope of rights under the new regime, it does raise one
additional significant over-protection concern. Traditional patent
infringement inquiries offer virtually no defenses." The market based
first-to-move lead-time incentive, however, includes the significant risk
that other market participants, driven by the same context and
competitive forces, might independently come to the same innovation.
Therefore, failure to incorporate an independent creation defense into
the supplemental incentive structure simultaneously over-protects the
inventor and discourages competitive parallel independent development
by others.
The easy solution of directly importing the "independent creation"
copyright defense? 6 into the new regime, however, would ignore critical
differences in the latter's operation. Unlike copyright law, the competi-
tive arts regime requires a substantial investment in obtaining protection
which could be destroyed by an independent creation exception. More
importantly, the description and enablement requirements, coupled with
publication, will raise strong suspicions that most subsequent adoption
will actually occur by copying. To accommodate these differences, the
proposed regime's independent creation defense should shift the burden
of proof. The plaintiff could still demonstrate the likelihood of
"copying" through access and substantial similarity (including the re-
lated possibility of innocent copying). " However, it would remain the
defendant's burden in each case, whether the plaintiff produced evi-
dence or not, to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the
innovation was actually internally developed by the defendant or an-
other party from whom it was received.23
Some attention should also be paid to non-market uses of protected
innovations. The description/enablement and publication requirements
eliminate much of the need for a reverse engineering exception.2 9 Nor
285. See Stem, supra note 5, at 138; Thomas, supra note 2, at 5-6.
286. The copyright holder is only protected against copying. See MERGES ET AL., supra
note 147, at 408-16, 506.
287. See id.
288. Although subsequent independent creation would provide a defense, such creation
would not, however, be protectable under the regime. See supra note 219-20 (discussing the
need for a novelty standard), note 272 (discussing the preference for a first to file system).
289. This exception mitigates the costs of trade secret protection. See Chiappetta, Myth,
supra note 11, at 129-32. Similar cost mitigation arguments have been urged by Professors
Cohen and Lemley regarding software patenting. See Cohen and Lemley, supra note 24, at
21-28. In the proposed competitive arts regime all of the necessary information would be
provided by the applicant's description/enablement.
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does the compulsory licensing system categorically prevent experimen-
tal use. Nonetheless, it might be argued that a potential subsequent
adopter should be permitted to better understand the technique or ex-
periment with modifications before incurring the royalty obligation. The
primary focus of the compulsory licensing requirement, however, is on
providing the holder with an opportunity to "lock-in" advantage in the
marketplace, not compensation. It, therefore, seems most consistent
with this objective to avoid any "free" competitor ramp-up opportunities
by requiring payment for any use.
Additionally, the regime should expressly internalize the territorial-
ity issues raised by the Internet. As with other intellectual property
regimes, United States competitive arts protection will only have effect
within its domestic jurisdiction. This raises issues concerning computer
implementation residing "off-shore." 290 To avoid this type of gamesman-
ship, the regime should avoid predicating liability on the geographic
location of the computing activity. The right of first implementation and
compulsory licensing provisions should, therefore, apply to any use of
protected competitive means which affects competition within the
United States market. 29'
Finally, the question of authority to create the proposed regime
should be briefly addressed. The action should be well within
Congressional power. If the competitive arts are part of the useful
arts, then the Intellectual Property Clause expressly permits such limited
time protection for the purpose of advancing progress in this particular
sub-field. If the competitive arts are not within the useful arts,
certainly a plausible argument,2' then the Commerce Clause
should provide ample authority.293 Regarding the United States'
290. See Timothy F. Myers, Foreign Infringement of Business Method Patents, 7 WIL-
LAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DISPUTE RESOLUTION 101 (2000) (discussing the problems of
determining where activity related to Internet transactions is taking place).
291. The approach is similar to the effort under § 271(g) of the Patent Act to protect
United States patent holders against "off-shore" infringement of process patents. 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(g) (1994). That section focuses on the product output from the process, raising a num-
ber of attendant definitional difficulties. In the case of a competitive means, the "product" is
much harder to define, exacerbating the problems. See Myers, supra note 290. The suggested
"effects" test avoids these difficulties. The approach finds support and guidance in the anti-
trust arena. Cf AREEDA, supra note 90, at 146-47.
292. See supra notes 57-87 and accompanying text.
293. There is the possibility that the Intellectual Property Clause, specifically the
"useful arts" and "science" limitations, circumscribe Congressional power to provide incen-
tives to innovation under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Chiappetta, Myth, supra note 11,
at 138-39 (noting the argument). The direct relevance of the competitive arts to commerce
may somewhat lessen the concern, but does not eliminate it. Although an important and
difficult technical question worthy of independent review, under the current policy analysis,
concerned only with the normative justifications for such a regime, the problem can be swept
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TRIPS294 treaty obligations, that agreement states that its patent
requirements apply only to "all fields of technology ... capable of
industrial application." 295  Because TRIPS expressly adopts the
"industrial arts" limitation,296 it is highly unlikely that a WTO panel
would, nor should it, find that the United States' lesser protection of
competitive arts (as distinguished from computing) innovations violated
these provisions.
The above regime addresses the special first-to-move lead-time
market failure arising between Internet competitors. The question re-
mains whether it should be extended to non-Internet implementations.
Although without empirical testing we cannot be sure, strong arguments
support adopting a hypothesis favoring general application to all inno-
vations in the competitive arts, Internet or otherwise.
First, the Internet-triggered market failure spills over to non-Internet
implementations. The Internet harms first-to-move lead-time, whether
or not the subsequent competing implementation takes place on or off of
the Internet. Similarly, if a competitor is permitted to implement the
inventor's non-Internet innovation on the Internet, all further adoptions
by the inventor's competitors will at least reflect some lead-time com-
pression.
Second, drawing the necessary distinction between Internet and
non-Internet implementations in a world of digital convergence is
hardly a straight-forward or cost-free exercise. Should protection attach
whenever any Internet use is demonstrated, even if the bulk of the ap-
plication occurs in the world of bricks and mortar? Does an Internet
implementation mean only use on a traditional website, or is any readily
visible supplier-buyer connection sufficient? And because the Internet is
hardly static, how does the dividing line get updated to ensure its con-
tinued applicability in the face of technological advance? These
ambiguities will generate substantial costs for the regulatory agency
charged with administration, the courts, and private parties.
Finally, because competitive arts implementations increasingly
involve computing implementations, the underlying quick and cheap
copying problem is likely affecting all competitive arts innovation,
Internet and otherwise. General application of the new regime would not
only mitigate this general distortion, but its public disclosure and
away by the possibility of an appropriate Constitutional amendment. See supra notes 86-88
and accompanying text.
294. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Apr. 15, 1994, 108
Stat. 4809, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TR/PS].
295. Id. at 27.
296. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Thomas' advo-
cacy of the "industrial arts" as a definition for the useful arts).
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post-term dedication structure would provide the same social benefits of
the comparable patent law requirements.297
IV. WHAT Do WE Do IN THE MEANTIME
(OR WHILE WAITING FOR GODOT)?
The concerns addressed in this symposium are not restricted to
musings regarding what an appropriate future regime could look like.
The CAFC has pronounced that business methods are patentable subject
matter. The USPTO has received a flood of actual applications and is
issuing increasing numbers of patents. These patents are generating very
real infringement lawsuits. The above arguments make it appear ex-
tremely likely that this application of traditional patent law to the
competitive arts is a very poor idea. The resulting over-protection dis-
torts competition, reduces market efficiency and, if economic theory
holds, adversely affects aggregate social wealth. Therefore, even if we
are not (yet) prepared to take the dramatic step of implementing an en-
tirely new regime, some significant alterations should be made
immediately.
The earlier policy arguments, and the resulting outline of a new
competitive arts regime, provide substantial guidance for this effort. The
application of the existing intellectual property laws should target, to the
maximum extent possible, the same policy objective justifying the pro-
posed regime: remedying the effects of quick and cheap copying on the
normal first-to-move lead-time market incentive to competitive arts in-
novation while minimizing related social costs. This results in two
fundamental guiding principles. First, the damage caused by applying
existing intellectual property laws must not be increased. The primary
regimes applying incentives to innovation are patent and copyright
law.*.8 The functional nature of competitive arts method inventions
makes them far better suited to protection under the former rather than
under the latter. State Street Bank, as presently interpreted and applied,
effectively performs the necessary channeling function by offering
strong traditional patent protection. However, making the adjustments
suggested below will substantially reduce the scope of those rights and
the related competitive advantage, increasing the motivation to look
297. The public disclosure objectives of patent law created substantial concern over the
overlap with trade secret law. See Chiappetta, Myth, supra note 11, at 136-39. Because the
purpose of the new regime is not to drive public disclosure but only to limit its adverse ef-
fects on innovation in the context of quick and cheap copying, the trade secret alternative
does not interfere with the new regime's objectives. See supra notes 189, 215.
298. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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elsewhere.2 9 Any resulting attempts to obtain copyright protection for
more than specific expression risks serious additional distortions and
should be consistently and forcefully rejected.
Second, the adverse effects of applying patent law can be substan-
tially reduced by aligning the qualification requirements, rights, and
remedies as closely as possible with the characteristics of the proposed
competitive arts regime. Because the proposed regime generally paral-
lels the patent approach to qualification, a variety of ready adjustments
to traditional patent law can substantially reduce the number of "bad"
competitive arts patents (those which are unjustified even under the
terms of traditional patent law) and appropriately limit the reach of
"good" ones (those that, although technically justified, offer excess in-
centive and generate excess costs in the case of the competitive arts).
The necessary adjustments to examination procedures are well
within the USPTO's discretion. The number of inappropriate competi-
tive arts patents can be substantially reduced by carefully distinguishing
between computing and competitive means innovations. Applicants
should be routinely challenged concerning the precise point of innova-
tion as a method for separating the two categories.3 Not only will this
better define the appropriate claims, but it will clearly focus the investi-
gation for relevant prior art. Claims supported only by innovation in
computing (increased speed of calculation, efficiency in resource use
and the like) should be clearly and expressly limited to cover only the
specific computing advance. Any attempt to extend such claims to pre-
empt alternative implementations or general use of the competitive arts
technique itself should be routinely treated as over-broad and appropri-
ately restricted. ' Similarly, claims which do preempt all use of a
299. As was the case in the software industry when it appeared that patent protection
was not available. See generally Karijala, A Coherent Theory, supra note 14.
300. See Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra note 8, at 174-75.
301. This does not mean that novel and non-obvious software solutions are unpatent-
able merely because they are used to implement competitive arts methods. See supra note
56. For example, computing techniques used to implement competitive arts methods on the
Internet, such as cookies (for targeted advertising programs) or hyper-linking (for affiliate
referrals), certainly would qualify on their own for patent protection if novel and non-
obvious. Additionally, those novel techniques would support a patent claim covering their
use in a specific implementation of the competitive arts method. Such computing novelty
cannot, however, support a general patent claim covering all implementations of the com-
petitive arts method. That broad claim must rest instead on the demonstrable novelty of the
competitive art method itself (collecting and processing customer information for targeted
advertising or providing appropriate referrals); provided, of course, my view is rejected and
such methods are patentable subject matter. A likely effect will be that computing innovation
patents will contain at least one broad independent claim which is not application-specific,
as well as a series of dependent claims covering use in particular implementations.
A related, but more difficult issue, is whether novelty in the competitive arts method can
support, directly or indirectly, claims to a computing implementation which does not present
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competitive arts technique must be supported by demonstrated innova-
tion in that technique, independent of the computing implementation."'
Nor should there be hesitation in ensuring that the examiners have
appropriate training and experience in the competitive arts, or that the
necessary tools and techniques are available and applied to locate rele-
vant prior art.3"3 Moreover, examiner incentives can easily be adjusted to
drive the creation of the complete and precise record necessary to en-
sure well-defined and appropriately limited claims.'0
4
Making substantive legal changes in the qualification process, re-
quires dealing with the constraints of existing law. Many mitigating
changes are, however, possible with only minor cooperation from the
any specific independent advance in computing techniques (faster processing, less resources,
special data structures). This is a complex and lengthy discussion, leading beyond the time
constraints imposed on completing the present endeavor, but does deserve at least a few
words. In support of patentability it can be argued that the requisite novelty can be found in
either: (1) the application of the pre-existing computing techniques to the new competitive
art method (I am indebted to Professor Takenaka who pointed out this apt analog to patent-
able new uses of a known product) or (2) in the special application or combination of the
pre-existing computing solutions required to implement the new competitive art method. My
earlier statements on the matter can be unfelicitously interpreted as overly dogmatic, indi-
cating an inappropriateness of placing any reliance on the new non-computing method in
such cases. See Alan L. Durham, "Useful Arts" in the Information Age, 1999 BYU L. REv.
1419, 1526-27 (1999); Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra note 8, at 171 (in fairness
the "taken as prior art" references were limited, or at least intended to be limited, to avoiding
claims to novelty based on ignorance of another art). The proper analysis is that, although
competitive arts novelty cannot provide direct support for the computing implementation, the
development of a related computing implementation does raise the perfectly appropriate
question of whether the new application of the pre-existing computing techniques is new and
non-obvious. If each computing element is doing precisely what it did before and all the
elements operate in undifferentiated combinations or relationships to one another, all per-
forming in the same way and to the same computing purpose, the computing arts application
is obvious (the application of the existing product to its existing use). In such a case, the only
novelty comes from the new competitive arts method and no patent on the computing im-
plementation should issue. Id. at 172 (no patent should issue if the "only novelty" resides in
the non-patentable subject matter). If, however, it requires insight beyond that possessed by
one of ordinary skill in the computing arts to recognize that the particular pre-existing tech-
nique, a special combination of such techniques, or an adjustment in its or their use,
operation or relationship, is needed to accomplish the implementation, then the requisite
computing novelty/non-obviousness ("insight in that field") would be present (analogous to
the patentable application of an existing product to a new use). This non-obviousness, how-
ever, still only justifies a claim to the particular computing implementation, not a claim to
the competitive arts technique itself.
302. See supra note 301; Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra note 8, at 170-71.
303. See supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text. The USTPO "second look" at
business methods patents is a positive step in this direction. See, e.g., Q. Todd Dickinson,
Former PTO Director Q. Todd Dickinson Discusses Business Method Patents, Computer &
Internet LawCast available at http://www.lawcast.com (Mar. 5, 2001) (noting the reduction
in issuances as a result). Any such actions should, of course, be made subject to resource
constraints as well as appropriate cost-benefit decisions. Cf. Merges, supra note 5, at 596-
606.
304. See supra note 238-40 and accompanying text.
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judiciary. Regarding identification of prior art, although legislative ac-
tion is required to institute a third party opposition procedure,"' courts
can help increase the pressure on applicants to come forward with prior
art during examination. Even a modest adjustment in the application of
the inequitable conduct doctrine could place an appropriately greater
burden on the applicant to identify reasonably accessible information...
Many applicants will have wide ranging knowledge of actual market
activity. The critical inequitable conduct question when assessing appli-
cant knowledge, therefore, should be whether the applicant was aware
of relevant prior activity, not merely whether they knew of specific
published references. Similarly, inventorship should be read expan-
sively to draw in additional knowledge of the prior art.07 Many
competitive arts advances will involve collaboration among a number of
people in a particular business organization and the information avail-
able to each of the inventors should be tested.
Additionally, the State Street Bank admonition that "business meth-
ods [are] subject to the same legal requirements for patentability as
applied to any other process or method,"3 3 echoed in AT&T with
"ultimate validity ... depends on ... satisfying the other requirements
for patentability such as those set forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and
112,"309 make it clear that the traditional requirements of novelty, non-
obviousness and description-enablement continue to apply. Nonethe-
less, the current judicial interpretations of those requirements provide
significant opportunity for damage control.
The existing rules governing obviousness and utility can be easily
adapted to specifically reflect the competitive arts context.10 For
example, the three-step obviousness analysis set out in Graham v. John
305. Such legislative action has been, and continues to be, considered. See Boucher
Proposal, supra note 232. Additionally, the existing pre-issuance publication requirements
and re-examination procedures in the Patent Act, of course, apply to competitive arts appli-
cations in accordance with their terms.
306. Although the USPTO can amend Rule 56 or promulgate appropriate new rules, the
doctrine of inequitable conduct is of judicial origin and will require judicial modification to
reach beyond its current requirements. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. Of
course, if Congress acts on the matter, the difficulty evaporates. See, e.g., Boucher Proposal,
supra note 232.
307. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 239, at 720-26 (discussing joint inventorship).
308. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
309. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
310. See supra notes 247-54 and accompanying text (discussing changes to the non-
obviousness standard in the new regime). Although a reasonable case is made by these
authors and in the following text for USPTO flexibility in this area, it would provide firmer
footing and clarity if the judiciary would quickly offer confirmation.
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Deere Co.31 provides ample room for appropriate calibration.
Examination should proceed on the assumption that a person of ordinary
skill in the less technically intricate competitive arts requires far less in
the way of suggestion or motivation to make connections among
references. Similarly, because the competitive arts possess far greater
inherent interconnectivity, someone of ordinary skill in one of these arts
(marketing, for example) should normally be credited with a working
familiarity of a substantial range of other business practices (sales, order
processing and fulfillment, etc).3"3 Finally, the examiner should be
especially suspicious of non-obviousness assertions predicated solely on
having implemented a pre-existing business technique on the Internet,31
or relying on secondary considerations because objective verification
difficulties313 make the necessary chain of inferences even more
problematic than normal.3 6
Nor does existing judicial precedent preclude requiring a demon-
stration of actual utility. Alleging that a process increases the efficient
operation, sales or goodwill of a business does not make it so. To sup-
port the issuance of a patent, the applicant may be required to provide
credible supporting empirical evidence, demonstrating not only the ex-
pected output occurred, but the causal connection with the claimed
innovation.1 7
Finally, the courts should not only permit, but also employ these
same damage mitigating approaches when making their validity and
scope of claims determinations. The examination record should be care-
fully scrutinized to ensure compliance with the above described
requirements, including the heightened requirements of non-
obviousness and utility. The rule that no particular deference is owed
311. See 383 U.S. 1(1966).
312. This may require some change in the current CAFC directions. See Lunney, supra
note 165 (discussing the CAFC's drift away from the more liberal view of the Supreme
Court concerning obviousness); supra note 253 and accompanying text.
313. The effect is to expand the range of analogous prior art substantially. See Bagley,
supra note 254. Cf CHISUM ET AL., supra note 99, at 574-75 (discussing the concept of
analogous prior art).
314. The mere fact of Internet automation will rarely, if ever, be non-obvious to some-
one of ordinary skill in the computing arts. See Boucher Proposal, supra note 232 (creating a
presumption of obviousness in such cases); Chiappetta, Article of Manufacture, supra note 8,
at 169-70; supra note 31 and notes 300-02 and accompanying text (discussing the relation-
ship between the computing and competitive arts aspects of a claimed invention).
315. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text (discussing the objective verifica-
tion problems in the competitive arts).
316. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 147, at 214-15.
317. This test could be comparable to the utility demonstration required for pharma-
ceutical products, see id. at 162-63, or might mirror the new USPTO regulations concerning
the patenting of genetic material. See Revised Interim Utility Examination Guidelines, 66
Fed. Reg. 1092-02 (Jan. 5, 2001).
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(despite the presumption of validity) regarding prior art not considered
by the PTO on examination,16 should be readily invoked whenever ap-
plicable. Additionally, judicial infringement determinations should
reflect the carefully circumscribed rights, relying heavily on the exami-
nation record for definitions of terms as well as the appropriate scope of
the claims (including those in means plus function form). In particular,
the record should be routinely used to apply the Warner-Jenkinson--
Festo narrowing presumptions regarding equivalents"9 and, in conjunc-
tion with the heightened non-obviousness standard, for invoking the
doctrines of known-interchangeability and reverse equivalents.320 The
courts should also generously read the ambiguities in the statutory
"prior user" defense,32' particularly regarding the scope of coverage,3"
resolving them in favor of an expansive application of the provision to
all forms of competitive arts patents."
The most difficult adjustments involve remedies. Mirroring the
proposed regime requires a fundamental shift from a "property rules" to
a "liability rules" approach. 24 The judiciary has, under CAFC guidance,
traditionally (and arguably, increasingly) applied a property rules
standard in patent infringement cases. This has led to a substantial
increase in preliminary injunctions, and virtually routine permanent
injunctive relief, prohibiting any continued use of the patented invention
by the defendant.3" The appropriateness of the property rules approach
has been supported by a number of arguments which must be overcome
for the necessary shift to take place. Particularly appealing to the courts
in recent years has been to view the statutory right to prevent use by
others as giving the holder a virtually Blackstonian property right, thus
justifying equivalent remedial treatment.3 26 Additionally, the novel and
318. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text
320. See supra notes 282-84 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 209 and accompanying text
322. See Barney, supra note 209, at 262-64 (noting the ambiguous reach of the phrase
"method of doing or conducting business").
323. The defense does pose a quandary of sorts, as broad application will exacerbate
other possible problems. See supra note 209.
324. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
halienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (discussing the
concepts of property and liability rules approaches to remedies).
325. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power without
Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive
Remedies, 97 MicH. L. REv. 985, 988 and 1020 (1999); CHISUM ET ,A.., supra note 99, at
1341-42, 1355. But see, ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 239, at 1080-81 (noting a recent trend
to cut back on preliminary injunctive relief).
326. See, e.g., Schneider (Europe) AG v. SciMed Life Sys., Inc. 852 F. Supp. 813, 861
(D. Minn. 1994) (conclusion of law #328, "A patent is a property right to which the patent
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non-obvious nature of a patented invention may be said to make it
unique, triggering the traditional related presumption that compensatory
damages are inadequate. Finally, the uncertainty caused by the difficulty
of properly determining damages makes it very difficult to provide "fair
compensation" under a "take and pay" liability rule remedy. This failure
may, in turn, substantially undermine the incentives to innovation at the
heart of the patent system.
Scrutiny of these arguments reveals that none of them supports the
routine granting of prohibitory injunctions, permanent or preliminary,
for infringement of competitive arts patents. The analogy to Blacksto-
nian property rights rests on seriously flawed logic. Merely because
patent rights include some (or even many) of the same characteristics as
tangible forms of property ownership does not automatically make
property rules remedial treatment appropriate. 27 The remedies must be
more carefully tailored to best accomplish the regime's specific policy
objectives.32 Patent rights exist as incentives to innovation for the good
of society. Although that incentive is generally articulated in the form of
the patent holder's right to exclude others, the precise nature of the right
(absolute or conditioned) should be defined and limited by the related
desire to avoid unjustified social costs (particularly in terms of denied
access). For the reasons discussed earlier,3 9 the incentive for competi-
tive arts innovation requires only a brief initial right to prohibit any use
(first-to-move) followed by a short-term conditional exclusivity released
on payment of a modest royalty (mimicking the lead-time advantage).
Twenty-year, property rule full prohibitory exclusivity, therefore, sub-
stantially over-protects, generating social costs well in excess of the
benefits, and must cede in competitive arts cases to a remedy reflecting
this more qualified "right to exclude."
"Uniqueness" is equally unconvincing. Although unique in the
technical sense, competitive arts inventions do not raise the traditional
need to ensure the inventor's possession of the single available exem-
plar of a specific item. The uniqueness interest patent law instead
involves preserving artificial scarcity by prohibiting the entirely possi-
ble non-rivalrous possession by others. Policy does not support
protecting the innovator's mere subjective desire to prohibit this posses-
sion by others, having expressly rejected the natural rights or
owner is entitled exclusivity."); Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 325, at 988; Lunney, supra
note 165 (discussing the "simply property" view of the CAFC.)
327. See Chiappetta, Myth, supra note 11, at 152-53 (discussing the similar problem in
trade secret law).
328. See id. at 155-57.
329. See supra notes 198-201, 257-68 and accompanying text.
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personhood interests of the inventor.330 This scarcity form of uniqueness
must therefore find support in the incentive-cost balancing, which as
noted immediately above, it cannot provide.
Nor are competitive arts inventions unique in the sense that the total
absence of a relevant market makes valuation impossible.331 In fact, the
innovation's value comes exclusively from its ability to provide com-
mercial advantage in the marketplace. Valuation difficulties nonetheless
offer the best argument for prohibitory injunctions in patent infringe-
ment cases. Although the presence of the market makes calculating
damages caused by patent infringement theoretically possible, in prac-
tice accurate determinations based on predictions of market conditions
and reactions over an extended future time horizon are extremely prob-
lematic. The related risk of consistent under-valuations (even if merely
as subjectively viewed by the inventor) can, therefore, have a significant
adverse effect on the ability of the patent incentive to drive invest-
ment.332 In traditional "industrial arts" patent law, the problem is
avoided through prohibitory injunctions which leave it to the discretion
of the patentee to decide how to best maximize the value of the patent.
The characteristics of competitive arts innovation and the reduced need
for incentives, however, make these under-valuation risks relatively in-
consequential and property rules inappropriately over-protective.333
These innovators do not require assurance of a fair return on the related
investment, only that the damage done to normal market first-to-move
lead-time advantage by quick and cheap emulation can be avoided. Be-
cause this assurance can be adequately provided through the first-to-
market right and a royalty based cost advantage,3' the valuation diffi-
culty justification for denying others access through a prohibitory
injunction is eliminated.
For these reasons, prohibitory preliminary and permanent injunc-
tions in the competitive arts generally should be abandoned and
replaced by compulsory licensing injunctions mirroring the remedy of-
fered under the proposed new regime. A strong argument can be made
that this shift to compulsory licensing injunctions is within the discre-
tion of the courts. Section 281 of the Patent Act does not mandate any
330. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
331. See Jeffery Standen, The Fallacy of Full Compensation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 145,
222-24 (1995) (noting this aspect of uniqueness in remedies law).
332. Cf. Chiappetta, Myth, supra note 11, at 157-58 (discussing a similar issue in the
trade secret context).
333. See Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 325, at 988 (arguing that denying routine pro-
hibitory injunctive relief will not substantially harm incentives to innovate even in traditional
fields of patenting).
334. See supra notes 257-68 and accompanying text.
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injunctive relief, much less injunctions prohibiting all use by the in-
fringer. 35 Traditional equitable principles, including adequacy of money
damages (sufficient to compensate for interfering with normal first-to-
move lead-time competitive advantage), balancing of the hardships and,
particularly, harm to the public (the serious costs of over-protection on
the operation of the market), all justify this more appropriate tailoring of
the remedy to the specific circumstances of competitive arts innova-
tion. 36
Permanent remedies present a relatively straightforward case. Upon
a finding of infringement, the court should permit continued use of the
invention against payment of an appropriate royalty.337 The infringer
retains the right to compete by using the invention, along with the right
to invest in improvements or employ other efficiencies to overcome the
holder's cost advantage. A complete implementation of the proposed
regime's cost-differentiating compulsory licensing system, however,
faces two serious technical difficulties under the current Patent Act.
First, § 2843's has historically been read to require a "fair market value"
royalty, rather than merely the cost-differentiating royalty called for
under the proposed regime. Using a fair market value royalty would
over-compensate the patent holder. However, unless the courts are
willing to specially interpret § 284's requirement of "adequate to com-
pensate" in the competitive arts context, legislative adjustment will be
required. Nonetheless, even an overly compensatory compulsory li-
censing approach is preferable to the prohibition of all competitive use
under the current permanent prohibitory injunction approach.
Second, the duration of the injunction will undoubtedly raise sig-
nificant issues in face of the statutory twenty-year term for patent
protection.3 9 The most appropriate solution would be to limit compul-
sory licensing injunctions to a period of time comparable to that
proposed in the new regime.3 ° An alternative more consistent with the
statutory language, might read the patent term as a moving window of
335. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1994) (courts "may grant injunctions in accordance with the
principles of equity... on such terms as the court deems reasonable") (emphasis added).
336. Cf MERGES ET AL., supra note 147, at 300-03 (discussing the equitable nature of
injunctive relief); id. at 302 n.2 (noting a few cases which even under traditional patent law
have granted a compulsory license). The factors suggested in the text would replace the more
"holder friendly" standards now generally applied. See, e.g., Amazon.com, Inc. v. Bame-
sandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting the assumption of
irreparable harm when a clear showing of validity and infringement is made).
337. The plaintiff should also receive costs and attorneys' fees to ensure that the cost
differential is not destroyed by the investment in obtaining it.
338. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994).
339. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
340. See supra notes 269-70 and accompanying text.
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protection against infringements. Under this view, injunctions would
issue at any time during the term, but would each last for only a limited
period of time. Despite the policy justifications, however, given the lan-
guage of the statute it is unlikely that courts would be willing to place
time limits on the royalty obligations shorter than the remainder of the
applicable patent's term. Some over-compensation of holders will,
therefore, likely be unavoidable. Once again, the mitigating effects of a
change to compulsory licensing remains preferable to the more serious
effects of routine grants of prohibitory injunctions.
Preliminary relief raises substantially more serious balancing con-
cerns. Granting a prohibitory preliminary injunction frequently has the
practical effect of deciding the dispute between the parties. Once or-
dered to stop use, the defendant must immediately find alternatives.
Additionally, during the pendency of the trial (and appeals), the plaintiff
can take steps to establish substantial lock-in advantages over the de-
fendant. Even if the preliminary injunction is subsequently reversed, the
defendant's commitment to the alternatives and the locked-in advan-
tages of the plaintiff may make the defendant's ultimate victory of little
consequence. As a result, improperly granted prohibitory preliminary
injunctions on competitive arts patents can seriously disrupt the normal
operation of the market. Therefore, the courts should abandon the ready
granting of such relief, insisting on a clear demonstration of non-
compensable harm even when the plaintiff shows a strong likelihood of
success.Y' ' The situation most likely to justify preliminary prohibitory
relief would be when the patent-holder has not yet had a reasonable time
to introduce the innovation itself. In such circumstances, failure to
promptly stop the competitor's use would deprive the holder of the dis-
tinctive benefits associated with first introduction.
The virtually complete elimination of preliminary relief in most
cases would, however, ignore the equally serious adverse effect on the
competitive arts inventor. Even if the innovator ultimately prevails, ob-
taining the post-judgment compulsory licensing royalty cost advantage
may come too late to be of significant value. The competitor's ability to
use the innovation during the extended course of the litigation will have
already undermined or destroyed any possible lead-time advantages.
Ready granting of compulsory licensing preliminary relief upon a
strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits cannot resolve
these conflicting interests entirely, but does provide a better balance.
341. See supra note 336 (discussing the assumption of irreparable harm in the Ama-
zon.con case).
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After circumspect judicial vetting beyond the USPTO examination, 
2
the system should favor protecting the lead-time advantage vital to a
meaningful incentive. Unlike prohibitory injunctions, the compulsory
licensing remedy provides some lead-time protection while giving the
competitor who believes ultimate success on the merits is probable, if
not inevitable, the option of continuing use. If the defendant believes
there is a strong likelihood of eventually prevailing, steps might even be
taken to mitigate the adverse effects of the unjustified cost-
differentiation. For example, interim financing may be available for all
or part of the differential using the anticipated recovery from the plain-
tiff's bond posted as security.
It is preferable that such preliminary relief require only payment of
the modest royalty proposed under the new regime. The interim nature
of the remedy provides a much stronger argument that even a fully
"compensatory" interpretation of the language of § 284 should yield to
general equitable principles in these cases, permitting a more appropri-
ately balanced outcome. In all events, regarding competitive arts
patents, even a fully compensatory compulsory license remains superior
to a prohibitory preliminary injunction or, in proper circumstances, no
preliminary relief at all.
The courts can further mitigate the effects of over-protection of
competitive arts innovation under traditional patent law by revitalizing
the doctrine of patent misuse.34 The courts should not hesitate to apply
traditional antitrust-based misuse and treat unjustified3 price-fixing,
tying or exclusive dealing activities"45 as falling outside the protective
umbrella of the patent grant. Similarly, when a patent provides suffi-
cient market power, monopoly entrenchment doctrines should be
brought to bear. These antitrust concerns, however, will likely have, at
342. It is worth recalling that the patent has undergone extensive USPTO review prior
to issuance. Both this examination and judicial review will help prevent over-reaching.
343. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 147, at 278-90 (discussing patent misuse).
344. The justifications should be limited to those available under traditional antitrust
law for these violations.
345. See Raskind, supra note 5, at 97-98 (discussing the reach of traditional patent
misuse). The reach of the doctrine is also subject 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1994).
346. Most particularly those related to refusals to deal/essential facilities. See, e.g., As-
pen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). The patent itself does
not, however, automatically trigger application of monopolization concerns, which requires
an assessment of the power the holder may have in the relevant market. See, e.g., Frank H.
Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 108-09
(1990). But see, In re Indep. Service Orgs. Antitrust Litigation, 203 F.3d 1322, 1325-28
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (concurring that a patent does not automatically demonstrate market power,
but noting the inapplicability of refusal to deal monopolization doctrines in the patent con-
text even if market power exists, except in very limited circumstances. For the reasons
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most, limited application to competitive arts patents. 47
To effect the appropriate balance the courts should break away from
the limited view of patent misuse as merely an extension of antitrust
law" and apply the doctrine to promote greater access (as would be
available under the proposed regime) through encouragement of volun-
tary licensing. This could be accomplished by returning to the basic
conception of misuse articulated by the Supreme Court in Motion Pic-
ture Patents Company v. Universal Film Manufacturing Company349 as
the attempt to obtain advantage beyond the rights granted under the pat-
ent laws. Specifically, the appropriate scope of a competitive arts
patent is not properly defined by an absolute right to exclude, but rather
by the more restricted compulsory licensing remedy. Consequently, at
worst an infringing defendant is entitled to a license on reasonable
terms. Viewed in this light, a holder's refusal to enter into a commer-
cially reasonable license on request constitutes an impermissible
extension of the patent right. By forcing the competitor/defendant into
litigation, the patent holder is unjustifiably prolonging the exclusion. In
such circumstances the patent should be unenforceable against the
party/infringer that requested the license.35'
Because the abuse concerns only unjustifiably forcing the infringer
into litigation, the existence of a reasonable basis for refusing to deal
should be a complete defense. Acceptable reasons might include factors
specific to the requestor, such as a history of breach in other dealings,
uncreditworthiness or a failure to agree to clearly reasonable licensing
terms (as measured by the terms that would be set under a judicially
mandated compulsory license).
discussed below in the text this position should be reevaluated in the competitive arts con-
text).
347. See Raskind, supra note 5, at 98.
348. See Raskind, supra note 5, at 98-101 (noting that this view, expressed by Judge
Posner, would all but eliminate an independent claim of patent misuse, and the CAFC's
apparent tendencies in that direction).
349. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
350. See also, B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (noting that "the patent misuse doctrine, born from the equitable doctrine of unclean
hands, is a method of limiting abuse of patent rights separate from the antitrust laws" (italics
added)); cf. Robert P. Merges, Who Owns the Charles River Bridge? Intellectual Property
and Competition in the Software Industry 28 (UC Berkeley Public Law and Legal Theory
Working Paper No. 15) available at http://papers.ssm.com (on file with MTILR) (noting the
possibility of policy based extensions based on the "impermissible broadening" foundations
of the misuse doctrine).
351. Because the objective is merely to encourage voluntary transactions, the penalty
should be substantially less draconian than the general non-enforceability under the misuse
doctrine.
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The primary obstacle to such an approach is § 271(d) of the Patent
Act; in particular, the express statement that no patent owner should be
"deemed guilty of misuse ... by reason of ... refus[al] to license ...
any rights under the patent ....,,312 Properly interpreted, however, this
provision should be limited to its original policy context of traditional
utility patenting and arguments over patent suppression. 53 Therefore,
when other factors are present, such as an unjustified refusal to license a
competitive arts patent, the courts should have free rein to invoke the
misuse doctrine. However, to more fully align the expanded misuse
doctrine with the statute, as well as to avoid defendant's routinely as-
serting misuse to harass or threaten patent holders, the courts might
limit competitive arts refusal to license misuse to cases where the in-
fringer can demonstrate that the particular innovation provides a
substantial competitive advantage. For example, an infringer might be
required to demonstrate that control over the technique at issue provides
sufficient market power to support a traditional tying violation.
3
Finally, the move away from generally available prohibitory relief
means that infringers must also be encouraged to seek a voluntary li-
cense. Absent a counter-incentive, in such circumstances the rational
infringer should simply adopt the innovation (made readily available
through description in the patent) and await the holder's response. At
best, the use will not be detected and no sanction will be imposed. At
worst detection will result in the payment of commercially reasonable
royalties. To avoid such strategic behavior by potential infringers, the
system should augment the sanctions in infringement actions whenever
the infringer has failed to request or accept a commercially reasonable
license. Such additional relief might include deterrence based punitive
damages or, at the extreme, the issuance of a prohibitory injunction for
some period of time.
352. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (1994).
353. Cf MERGES ET AL., supra note 147, at 286-88 (discussing patent suppression).
354. This level of power is less than that required for monopolization "refusals to
deal." See supra note 346. All that would be required is the holder have sufficient power to
coerce a licensee to accept other conditions as part of a voluntary transaction regarding the
competitive arts technique. Whenever there are adequate practical alternatives to the tech-
nique to preclude this power, there is arguably much less harm to the market from a refusal
to license and the related lack of access. This approach is consistent (if not identical) to that
taken by Congress, regarding "imposition of additional terms" patent misuse. 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(d)(5) (1994).
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CONCLUSION
The special circumstances of competitive arts innovation require
substantial adjustments to the intellectual property pantheon. An appro-
priate set of regimes would clearly channel the "industrial arts" in the
direction of traditional patent law, the "expressive arts" into existing
copyright law, and the "competitive arts" into a new regime reflecting
the far more limited need to supplement the normal market first-to-
move lead-time incentives to account for the quick and cheap copying
possible in the Electronic Age. As an interim (hopefully) measure, the
damage wrought by State Street Bank should be addressed by adminis-
trative and judicial adjustments more closely aligning the application of
patent law with the policy objectives of the proposed new regime.
